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. Introduction
On August 26, 1991, Katherine Redmond moved to Lincoln, Nebraska
to attend the University of Nebraska (University).' Upon her arrival, Red-
mond moved into a women's residence hall operated by the University.2
According to Redmond, less than a week after her arrival, she was sexually
assaulted and raped in an adjacent University residence hall? A few days
later, Redmond's assailant allegedly appeared at her residence hall and sex-
ually assaulted and raped her while two other males watched and stood guard.4
Redmond identified her assailant as Christian Peter, a prominent scholar-
ship athlete on the University's football team.5 According to Redmond,
Peter's sexual assault of her represented another incident in a pattern of
sexually abusive and lawless behavior by Peter that included arrests for:
sexual assault against another female student,6 assault for threatening to kill
1. See Complaint ofKatherine Redmond 19, Redmond v. University ofNeb., 1995 WL




5. Id. 60. The 6' 3", 300 pound Peter was a starting defensive lineman for aNebraska
football team that won two consecutive national championships. Terri Somers, The Boy Next
Door... Christian Peter's Hidden History, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Nov. 22, 1996, at Dl. His
peers elected him co-captain of the football team. Id.
6. See Complaint ofKatherine Redmond 40, Redmond (No. 4:CV95-3223). Peterwas
convicted of disturbing the peace and sentenced to 10 days in jail for allegedly grabbing a
female non-student by the neck in aNebraska bar. Eric Olson, Ex-Husker Peter StillAwaiting
Callfrom NFL Team, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, July 9, 1996, at 17SF. In May 1994, Peter
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 18 months for a third-degree sexual assault against a former
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a parking lot attendant, disturbing the peace, trespassing, and urinating in
public.'
On June 26, 1995, attorneys for Redmond filed a lawsuit against, inter
alia, the University and Christian Peter Redmond alleged that the University
engaged in a pattern of conduct - including refusing to investigate her allega-
tions of sexual harassment, failing to alleviate the sexual harassment,9 and
failing to investigate, counsel or discipline Peter" - that created a hostile
educational environment in violation of Title IX." Redmond specifically
claimed that the University
had a duty to provide and ensure an educational environment for the Plain-
tiff free of sexual innuendo, intimidation, and discriminatory animus and
to enforce the regulations, rules and laws necessary to protect the Plaintiff
and other female students from acts of sexual abuse, including but not
limited to bias and discrimination. The failure of the Defendants to take
action to prevent or stop sexual harassment constitute[d] deliberate indif-
ference and intentional discrimination. 2
Redmond also asserted claims against Peter sounding in sexual assault and
battery,' false imprisonment, 4 and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.
15
Redmond's allegations against Peter attracted national attention when the
New England Patriots selected him in the 1995 National Football League
(NFL) draft. 6 Following a public outcry over allegations of Peter's sexual
misconduct, the Patriots relinquished their rights to the football player. 7
Miss Nebraska. ld. She alleged Peter groped her while saying, "Come on, I know you like that."
George Diaz, Nebraska's Peter Fumbles in Life, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 3, 1996, at D3.
Peter's troubles with women preceded his matriculation at Nebraska. In high school, he
was suspended for an incident involving sexual misconduct toward female students. Somers,
supra note 5.
7. Complaint of Katherine Redmond 99 29-31, 39. Redmond v. University of Neb.,
1995 WL 928211 (D. Neb. Dec. 5, 1995) (No. 4:95CV-3223); see also Olson, supra note 6
(delineating various incidents for which Peter was arrested).





13. Id. 99 83-84.
14. ld. 90-92.
15. Id. 98, 101.
16. See Bill Porter, Pats Baffle Nebraska: Peter's Past Well Known, BOSTON HERALD,
Apr. 26, 1996, at 92.
17. See Somers, supra note 5.
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However, in January 1997 the NFL's New York Giants agreed to sign Peter
to a contract. According to the Giants, Peter had proven he was getting
treatment for the alcoholism and attention deficit disorder that he claimed
were the source of his behavioral problems.18 In March 1997, the University
agreed to pay Katherine Redmond an estimated $50,000 in settlement of her
claims against the school. 9 Theterms ofRedmond's settlementwithPeterwere
undisclosed."
The forgoing scenario draws attention to a complex and emotionally
charged issue residing within institutions of higher education: male student-
athlete violence against women students. 21 This Article explores the availabil-
18. See Mike Freeman, Giants Introduce Rookie with a Past, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1997,
at B 14.
19. See Woman to Receive $50,000 as Part of Peter Case Settlement, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, Mar. 9, 1997, at C8. The University stated that the payment would assist Redmond
to cover incurred and future medical expenses. See Nancy Hicks, Christian Peter Case Ends
in Settlement, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Mar. 8, 1997, at 45.
20. See Tom Pedulla, Peter Plans to Make Most of 'Last Chance' with Giants, USA
TODAY, May 30, 1997, at C14.
21. Although this Article's focus is on acts of sexual violence committed by college
athletes, the problem permeates all levels of competitive athletics, including high school and
professional. Notable instances of current and former athletes who are recipients of the
unwelcome notoriety that accompanies violence against women include: misdemeanor assault
charges against former Minnesota Vikings quarterback, Warren Moon, for allegedly striking and
choking his wife; the arrest of a Cincinnati Bengal defensive lineman for punching his four-
month pregnant girlfriend in the stomach; and the arrest of Atlanta Braves' manager Bobbie
Cox for allegedly striking his wife in the face with his fist. See Jimmy Smith, The Spotlight
Is on Domestic Violence, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 14, 1996, at Cl; see also
Gil B. Fried, Illegal Moves Off-The-Field, University Liability for Illegal Acts of Student-
Athletes, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 69, 70-71 (1997) (identifying various acts of violence
by athletes against women); Hal Bock, College Bad Boys: Not Just a Game: Even NCAA
Unsure How to Best Tackle Lawless Athletes, CHI TRiB., Dec. 8, 1996, at C6 (reporting Law-
rence Phillips's probation for incident in which he reportedly "grabbed [his former girlfriend
by] her hair 'caveman style,' pulled her down three flights of steps and slammed her head into
a wall"); Gordon Edes, Violent Reaction: Domestic Abuse Affecting Sports, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 20, 1997, at CI (discussing charges that Boston Red Sox outfielder Wilfedo Cordero
assaulted his wife); Richard RoeperAthletes'RecordsAre Made toBeBusted, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Jan. 6, 1997, at 11 (discussing allegations that four Grambling University football players raped
14-year old girl and noting Washington Redskin Leslie Shepard's guilty plea for punching
woman in face).
A particularly disturbing instance of sexual violence occurred at the high school level in
1989 in Glen Ridge, New Jersey. Members of the Glen Ridge High School football team
brutally assaulted a mentally retarded 17 year-old female classmate with a broom and baseball
bat while classmates observed. See Bernard Lefkowitz, The Boys Next Door, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED, June 23, 1997, at 76 (detailing events surrounding sexual assault). After losing the
battle to overturn the 1993 convictions for the assault, the three defendants were imprisoned in
1997. Jeffrey Gold, Three Resentenced in Rape of Retarded Girl, CHl. SUN-TIMEs, July 1,
1997, at 54.
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ity of Title IX as a vehicle for imposing legal liability on colleges and univer-
sities for acts of sexual violence" committed by their athletes against women
students. In addressing this issue, this Article endeavors to avoid the hyper-
bole that so often accompanies the discourse regarding this issue. Such
overstatement often involves claims without empirical basis regarding the
extent to which athletes, in contrast to other males in our society, engage in
acts of sexual violence against women.' Therefore, a necessary predicate to
this Article's discussion of institutional accountability is to present the social
and factual context surrounding student-athlete sexual violence against
women students. Part II begins this process with a review of literature that
attempts to answer a fundamental question: Do male athletes, in contrast to
nonathletes, possess a greater propensity to engage in acts of sexual aggres-
sion against women?24 Although the research to date fails definitively to
establish a positive correlation, this Article proposes that various factors -
principally the disproportionate influence of sports in reinforcing cultural
themes - nevertheless warrants exploring approaches to changing the condi-
tions that contribute to athlete assault against women.'
Against this backdrop, Part III explores the circumstances under which
it may be appropriate to hold institutions liable pursuant to Title IX for acts
of sexual violence committed by their male student-athletes. This discussion
begins with an examination of current law regarding teacher-to-student and
student-to-student sexual harassment.26 After exploring the evolution of
judicial recognition of Title IX hostile environment sexual harassment
claims,2 the Article examines the substantive standards that courts have
adopted for determining institutional liability.28 A review of Title IXjurispru-
dence suggests that courts will apply either a Title VII or an intentional
discrimination substantive standard in assessing the limits of institutional
22. Acts of sexual violence against women constitute one manifestation of sexual harass-
ment which is defined herein as the "imposition of unwelcome sexual demands or the creation
of sexually offensive environments." DEBORAH L. RHODE, JusTIcE AND GENDER 231 (1989);
see also CATHARINE A. MACKNNON, SE AL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979)
(defining sexual harassment as "unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of
a relationship of unequal power"); Jill Suzanne Miller, Title Viand Title VII: Happy Together
as a Resolution of Title IX Peer Sexual Harassment Claims, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 699, 707
(defining sexual harassment in education context as "the use of authority to emphasize the
sexuality or sexual identity of the student in a manner which prevents or impairs the student's
full enjoyment of education benefits, climate, or opportunities" (citation omitted)).
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See infra Part HI.
27. See infra Part III.B.2.a.
28. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
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liability. 9 The Article concludes that doctrine and policy support recognizing
Title IX claims involving student-athlete violence against women students. °
It also proposes that whether courts adopt a Title VII or intentional discrimi-
nation standard in assessing institutional liability for such misconduct, Title
IX may still provide a means of redress for women who are sexually harassed
by student-athletes."
I. A Propensity for Sexual Aggression?
A. Empirical Research
Prior to 1990, researchers devoted little attention to assessing whether
there is a positive connection between participation in college athletics and
sexual assault.32 The growing, yet still limited, body of research conducted
since then has not reached incontrovertible conclusions regarding such an
association. The recent undertakings, however, have contributed to the
development of what appears to be two principal schools of thought. While
deploring acts of sexual aggression,33 some authorities argue that college
athletes are no more prone to commit violent acts against women than other
males in American society." According to this view, the notoriety athletes
receive in the popular press creates the misleading impression that athletes
have a greater propensity to commit violent acts against women.35 Adherents
29. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See infra Part III.B.
32. See Todd W. Crosset et al., Male Student-Athletes Reported For Sexual Assault: A
Survey of Campus Police Departments andJudicial Affairs Offices, J. SPORT & SOCIAL ISSUES,
May 1995, at 126, 128.
33. These commentators emphasize that their skepticism of studies suggesting a greater
propensity by athletes to sexually assault women is not a back-door attempt to downplay the
gravity of the problem. See Edes, supra note 21. For example, although he challenges the
studies that conclude apositive relationship exists between participation in competitive athletics
and violence against women, Richard Lapchick, director of Northeastern University's Center
for the Study of Sports in Society, nevertheless argues for a zero tolerance policy that seeks to
send a two-fold message: the intolerance of sexual crimes against women and the need to afford
greater protection for women against such crimes. Id. These goals led the National Consortium
for Academics and Sport, a group of major colleges and universities, to adopt a resolution
pursuant to which an athlete convicted of gender violence would be banned for a year from
sport. Id.
34. See Chris Cobbs, Fair or Foul? Sports Heroes Tagged as More Abusive, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, Mar. 10, 1996, at Al.
35. See Crosset et al., supra note 32, at 126 (noting argument that greater scrutiny to
which athletes are subjected by media "creates a distorted perception regarding the proportion
of athletes who commit sexual assault and fails to account for the large number of athletes who
do not commit sexually aggressive acts"); Thomas L. Jackson, A University Athletic Depart-
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to this view also argue that the empirical data has failed sufficiently to support
assumptions that the violent overtones of football, hockey, and other sports
are integral to the other parts of athletes' lives.36
Other authorities adopt the contrary position that "athletes appear to be
disproportionately involved in incidents of sexual assault on college cam-
puses."3 Two factors appear particularly important to the authorities holding
this contrary position. First, although adherents to this view recognize that
sexual violence is the product of multiple variables, 8 they identify the subcul-
ture of which athletes are a part as a significant contributor to an athlete's
slightly greater propensity to engage in sexual violence. "[A]ggression on the
playing field, sexist language and attitudes in the locker room, and an inordi-
nate need to prove one's maleness can combine in complex ways to predis-
pose some male athletes towards off-the-field hostility." 9 Second, researchers
argue that the existing research establishes that athletes may be slightly more
prone to violence.4°
ment's Rape andAssault Experiences, 32 J. C. STUDENT DEV. 77, 77 (1991) (concluding that
much greater media attention is given to cases involving athlete versus nonathlete assaults
against women); Merrill Melnick, Male Athletes and Sexual Assault, J. PHYSICAL EDUC.,
RECREATION, &DANCE, May-June 1992, at 32,32 (noting media's tendency to magnify crimes
committed by public figures, including athletes); Bock, supra note 21 (noting anecdotal
evidence that suggests that athletes are unfairly targeted because of their high profile); Smith,
supra note 21 (commenting that one group of sports authorities believes athletes are unfairly
stereotyped as violent sexual abusers because of their visibility).
36. See Smith, supra note 21 (quoting Richard Lapchick).
37. Crosset et al., supra note 32, at 135.
38. These factors include media promotion ofviolence, "apatriarchal system, myths about
rape, sexual values and scripts that men and women use in relating to each other." See Cobbs,
supra note 34 (quoting Mary Koss). According to sociologists who have examined male athlete
violence:
Sexual aggression is widely recognized as multiply determined. It is influenced by
ahierarchy ofsocial forces including societal-level supports (cultural values, sexual
scripts), institutional influences (peer groups, schools, religious groups), the dyadic
interpersonal context (relationship characteristics, victim characteristics, miscom-
munication, the situation surrounding the social interaction), and characteristics of
the individual man (attitudes, personality traits, gender schema, attraction to sexual
aggression, sex/power motives).
Mary P. Koss & John A. Gaines, The Prediction ofSexualAggression by Alcohol Use, Athletic
Participation, andFraternity Affiliation, J. INTRPERSONAL VIOLENCE, Mar. 1993, at 94, 94-95
(citations omitted).
39. Melnick, supra note 35, at 33 (concluding however that further research is necessary
to determine whether "physically aggressive, intimidating behavior taught and learned in some
sport contexts transfers to nonsport situations").
40. Some studies have concluded that athletes appear more likely than non-athletes to
commit acts of sexual aggression against women. See, e.g., Crosset et al., supra note 32, at 128;
Timothy Jon Curry, Fraternal Bonding in the Locker Room: A Profeminist Analysis of Talk
55 WASH. & LEE L REV 55 (1998)
Even those who ascribe to the view that athletes are disproportionately
involved in sexual assaults, however, warn against extracting concrete con-
clusions and overly broad generalizations from existing research. Both the
limited body of research and the scientific methodology utilized therein
underlies their call for caution.4 For instance, a 1995 study reported that
"athletes appear to be disproportionately involved in incidents of sexual
assault on college campuses."'42 In reaching this conclusion, however, the
study's authors emphasized its limitations. Most notably, the finding was
based on a limited survey, and the disproportionate number is not overwhelm-
ing.43 They also noted a desire to avoid overstating the problem as many
commentators in the popular press have done." In this regard they dispelled
the notion that the disproportion reaches the high levels (thirty-three percent)
reported by many scholars and journalists. 4"
In sum, the empirical research has failed to provide unchallenged evi-
dence of an athlete's propensity for sexual aggression against women.46 The
About Competition and Women, Soc. SPoRTJ., June 1991, at 119, 133-34 (proposing that sexist
locker room culture of athletics may reinforce "notions of masculine privilege and hegemony"
in young men); Koss & Gaines, supra note 38, at 104-05 (concluding that research results
confirmed some relationship between formal sports involvement and sexual aggression, but
noting that "sports" variable was less important of predictor than alcohol and drug use);
Melnick, supra note 35, at 32 (identifying studies that suggest greater propensity by athletes to
sexually assault women). But see Jackson, supra note 35, at 77-78 (concluding that study of
one university's athletic department revealed "similar frequencies of perpetrators in athlete and
non-athlete samples" but calling for further research).
41. See Crosset et al., supra note 32, at 127-29, 135 (pointing out that significance and
reliability ofthose few studies conducted thus farhave been circumscribed due to limited samples
and/or unscientific methodology); Koss & Gaines, supra note 38, at 95-96 (arguing that few
studies that have posited positive relationship between sexual aggression and membership in
athletic and other campus organizations are open to serious methodological challenge); see also
Cobbs, supra note 34 (questioning propensity of college athletes to commit violence).
42. Crosset et al., supra note 32, at 135.
43. Id. at 134-35.
44. Id. at 136.
45. Id. at 135. A primary source of claims that athletes commit one in three campus
sexual assaults was a 1996 newspaper article. Id. The author of the article admits, however,
that his findings were flawed in that the figures on which he relied were based on a non-
scientific informal survey of university officials. Id. Despite these limitations, the one in three
figure has been relied on by scholars and journalists. Id.
46. See Note, Out ofBounds: Professional Sports Leagues andDomestic Violence, 109
HARv. L. REV. 1048, 1050-51 (1996) (concluding uncertainty surrounds question of propensity
of athletes, in contrast to nonathlete males, to commit violent acts toward women); William
Nack & Lester Munson, Sports' Dirty Secret, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 31, 1995, at 62, 68
(noting that there are no definitive answers to questions of whether athletes abuse their mates
more than nonathletes, whether something inherent in sports encourages sexual abuse, or
whether heightened scrutiny of athletes creates such impression); see also Cobbs, supra note
34 (stating "[t]here is no unchallenged evidence that athletes are more likely than other men to
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data has established the need for a comprehensive inquiry into the relationship
between participation in athletics and sexual violence.
B. Sport's Influence in Shaping Cultural Values
The inconclusiveness of research attempting to establish a relationship
between athletic participation and sexual violence underscores the need to
exercise restraint to avoid unfairly labeling and stereotyping athletes.47 It is
equally important, however, not to marginalize the problem of male athlete
sexual violence against women. Indeed, overemphasis on the question of the
propensity of athletes, in comparison to non-athletes, to engage in acts of
sexual aggression risks obscuring an important reality: the impact of athlete
violence against women may exceed its actual quantifiable prevalence. As the
following discussion demonstrates, the potentially disproportionate influence
of acts of sexual aggression by athletes against women is intimately tied to the
role afforded sport and its participants in American society.
1. Sport's Reinforcement of Cultural Themes
Like other institutions, sport reflects and reinforces cultural themes,"
both empowering and harmful, thatpervade our society.49 For instance, values
generally considered positive and empowering, such as those associated with
hard work and success, are disseminated through sport. Commenting on why
sports-related opportunities must be expanded for women, Norma Cantu,
commit assaults").
47. Richard Lapchickwisely warns againstsuch stereotypes, particularly givenits possible
racial dimensions. Richard Lapchick, Justice Always Deserves a SecondLook THE SPORTING
NEWS, Feb. 19,1996, at 8. Henotes that "as African-Americans have cometo dominate ourmost
popularsports," thepublicseemsmorewillingtobelievetheworst, includingthe stereotype devel-
oped in today's society ofAfrican-Americans "as being on the edge of the criminal world." Id.
48. Sport, as an institution, both reflects and contributes to shaping values and cultural
norms in American society. See D. STANLEYEITZEN&GEORGEH. SAGE, SOCIOLOGY oFNORTH
AMERICAN SPORT 17,55(5th ed. 1993) (noting sport represents microcosm of society in which
it is embedded); DREW A. HYLAND, PmLOSOPHY OF SPORT 2 (1990) (noting sport also teaches
values reflected in it); Harry Edwards, Playoffs and Payoffs: The African-American Athlete as
an InstitutionalResource, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 85, 85 (Billy J. Tidwell ed., 1994)
(discussing how sport reflects and recapitulates America's evolving social realities).
49. Fromthepositiveperspective, sportreinforces majorthemes ofwhathas been called the
American Sports Creed. In this regard, commentators "assertthat sport builds character, teaches
discipline, develops competitiveness, prepares participants to compete in life, enhances physical
and mental fitness, and contributes to a belief in (Christian) religion and a patriotic belief in
America." HOwARDL.NIXONII&JAMESH. FREY, A SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT 41 (1996). Accord-
ing to this perspective, sport instills within its participants values of teamwork, self-discipline,
fair play, perseverance, sacrifice and hard work. See HYLAND, supra note 48, at 2; D. Stanley
Eitzen, EthicalDilemmas inAmerican Sport, 62 VITAL SPEECHES OFTHEDAY 182, 182 (1996).
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Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights in the Justice Department, asserts that the
"values we learn from participation in sports [include] teamwork, standards,
leadership, discipline, work ethics, self-sacrifice, pride in accomplishment,
[and] strength of character.""t°
On the other hand, sport as a microcosm of society"' also possesses and
thereby reinforces the negative qualities of the society that it reflects.5" In this
regard, participation in sport is one of multiple social mechanisms53 that
introduces boys to conceptualizations of maleness." In this sense, involve-
ment in sport constitutes a "gendering process" inasmuch as the values and
ideology that reside in sport are not gender neutral.55 "Through sports, boys
are trained to be men, to reflect all the societal expectations and attitudes
surrounding such a rigid role definition., 56 Thus, as a social institution, sport
represents an external dynamic that socializes boys and helps to sculpt their
developing gender identities."
50. See Rodney K. Smith, When Ignorance Is NotBliss: In Search ofRacial and Gender
Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 Mo. L. REV. 329, 340 (1996) (quoting Norma Cantu).
Professor Smith astutely notes that while Cantu offers some empirical evidence to support her
conclusion, many ofthese values are controversial. Id. at 340-41; see also Gregory M. Travalio,
Values and Schizophrenia in Intercollegiate Athletics, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 587, 587 (1991)
(questioning whether intercollegiate athletics is appropriate vehicle for transmitting values often
used to justify status of college sports).
51. See, e.g., EITZEN & SAGE, supra note 48, at 17 (stating that sport provides useful
institution for examining complexities of larger society because it represents microcosm of
society in which it is embedded); HYLAND, supra note 48, at 2 (urging recognition that sport
is reflection of society's values); NIXON & FREY, supra note 49, at 39 (noting that practices,
norms, and values dominant in sport parallel those in society's culture).
52. These problems include drug abuse by athletes, cheating by athletes and coaches, and
violence. HYLAND, supra note 48, at 42; Eitzen, supra note 49, at 183-84.
53. Various factors contribute to the socialization process. One commentator notes:
Through socialization, individuals learn to behave in accordance with the expecta-
tions of others in the social order. This social learning is accomplished through a
network of ideological beliefs that is socially agreed upon with respect to expecta-
tions pertaining to appropriate behaviors, attitudes, and values in a wide range of
situations. In addition, socialization is an influential process mediated by individu-
als, groups, and cultural practices; the outcome of socialization is the acquisition
of an agreed-upon system of standards and values.
Susan L. Greendorfer, Gender Role Stereotypes andEarly ChildhoodSocialization, in WOMEN
IN SPORT: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 3, 3-4 (Greta L. Cohen ed., 1993) (citations omitted).
54. See MICHAEL A. MESSNER, POWER AT PLAY 19 (1992).
55. Id.
56. See id. at 20 (footnote omitted) (quoting sociologists Donald Sabo and Ross RunFola).
57. Id.at22. According to Messner, the developmentofmalegender identity is aproduct
of the dynamic interaction of internal (conscious and less conscious values and beliefs) and
external (social institutions) influences. Id Consequently, it is not solely the product of either
but rather comes into existence as a result of the interplay between the personal dynamic and
social context. Id.
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Commenting on the influence of sport in shaping gender identity, some
feminist scholars argue that the values residing within sport contribute to the
construction of male identity in ways that are harmful to women." This
perspective is captured in the following comment:
[S]port is an institution that creates and reproduces male power and domi-
nation in this culture.... [S]port serves as a central site for the production
of male supremacy and hypermasculinity, not only in sport, but in the larger
social order. Perhaps most important is the direct connection between
sport as a cult of masculinity and gender relationship built on power, domi-
nation, and control.... [A] central element of the sport experience for
men is equating manhood and masculinity with attitudes and behaviors that
demean and devalue women.59
Similarly Michael Messner, a professor of sociology from the University
of California, Berkley, argues that
sport is a social institution, that, in its dominant forms, was created by and
for men.... [T]he gendered values of the institution of sport [make] it
extremely unlikely that [young men will] construct anything but the kinds
of personalities and relationships that [are] consistent with the dominant
values and power relations of the larger gender order.... The fact that
winning was premised on physical power, strength, discipline, and willing-
ness to take, ignore, or deaden pain inclined men to experience their own
bodies as machines, as instruments of power and domination - and to see
other peoples' bodies as objects of their power and domination.6"
58. See id. at 20 (noting researchers who agreed that, although sport socializes boys to
values and attitudes that will serve them well as men, such values and skills often perpetuate
domination of women). In addition, athletes are often encouraged by parents, brothers and
sports enthusiasts, to assume a hyper-masculine style.
59. Mary Jo Kane & Lisa J. Disch, Sexual Violence andthe Reproduction ofMale Power
in the Locker Room: The "Lisa Olson Incident," SOC. SPORT J., Dec. 1993, at 331,334 (cita-
tions omitted). Others have expressed similar views:
Sport as a male preserve, then, is an important cultural practice that contributes to
the definition and recreation of gender inequality.... What has been emphasized
here is that sport's capacity to recreate- or transform- gender relations arises from
its capacity to give meaning and realization to patriarchal forms of power and
domination. The analysis of how sport contributes to gender inequality must
therefore attend to the connections between sport as social practice and broader
patterns of gender relations.
Nancy Theberge, Toward a Feminist Alternative to Sport as a Male Preserve, in WOMEN,
SPORT AND CULTURE 181, 186 (Susan Birrell & Cheryl L. Cole eds., 1994); see Lois Bryson,
Sport and the Maintenance ofMasculine Hegemony, in WOMEN, SPORT, AND CULTURE, supra,
at 4748, 60 (arguing that sport supports male hegemony, in part, because of public's exposure
to positively sanctioned use of aggression and violence by men); Kane & Disch, supra, at 335
(agreeing with argument that male athlete assaults against women are "part of a larger pattern
of behavior with roots firmly planted in the very structure and culture of [men's] sport").
60. MESSNER, supra note 54, at 150-51; see Crosset et al., supra note 32, at 128 (noting
that organized competitive sports have been described as supporting male dominance and sexist
practices).
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Despite sport's significance, it is inappropriate to cast sport as the
primary influence with respect to the production and reproduction of mascu-
line identity.6 Indeed, sport is merely one of the features of the "wider social
structure that affect the relative power chances of the sexes."'62 Yet, it is
generally believed that "assaultive behavior is learned behavior[ ] and that
abuse against women builds on traditional assumptions about gender roles."63
Therefore, to the extent that sport perpetuates such patterns of behavior
through the reinforcement of traditional gender roles, it represents one of the
strands that nurture the attitudes and beliefs that produce sexual violence by
athletes.
2. The Impact of Athletes'Behavior - Real or Imagined
The status afforded athletes in American society may exacerbate the
potentially harmful influence of sport in shaping cultural attitudes that con-
tribute to athlete violence against women. "Because star athletes are held in
such high esteem, they frequently find themselves worshiped by their adoring
publics."' A consequence of this adoration is that athletes are afforded a
place in society which, at least historically, has given them and the public the
perception that they are impervious to the standards65 that dictate the behavior
of others.66 Privileged status, when combined with other factors,67 produces
a distorted or unrealistic view of interpersonal relationships.68
61. See Eric Dunning, Sport as a Male Preserve: Notes on the Social Sources ofMascu-
line Identity andIts Transformations, in WOMEN, SPORTAND CULTURE, supra note 59, at 163,
177.
62. Id.
63. RHODE, supra note 22, at 244.
64. Melnick, supra note 35, at 33.
65. Michael O'Connor, Football Docs Blame Coddling ofPeter, BOSTONHERALD, Apr.
27, 1996, at 033 (noting that sociologists assert belief that many athletes who receive special
treatment beginning when they are youths eventually develop attitude that, as long as they per-
form in sports, they have impunity to violate society's norms).
66. See Melnick, supra note 35, at 33 ("American society holds 'star' athletes in such
high regard that it is no wonder that these athletes expect, if not demand, differential treatment
for their transgressions. The privileged status of star athletes begins in youth sports and extends
all the way to the professional ranks."); Nack & Munson, supra note 46, at 70, 73 (discussing
how status afforded athletes by worshiping public makes it difficult for society to accept that
those athletes engage in abuse and therefore makes convictions more difficult).
67. Other factors that contribute to domestic violence among professional and college
athletes include alcohol and drug abuse, steroid use, and the increasing aggressiveness in sports.
David Holmstrom, Do Aggressive Sports Produce ViolentMen?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MoNrroR, Oct.
16, 1995, at 1.
68. This special "athlete" status, when combined with a "fundamental disrespect for
women" lays - if unchecked - the foundation for a message that it is permissible for athletes
to sexually abuse women. Robert Lipsyte, Married to the Game, One More Athlete's Wife
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This privileged status may be more pernicious than merely contributing
to shaping the multiple aspects, including social relationships, of the lives of
individual athletes. 9 Sociologists argue that the conduct of athletes extends
beyond their peers to influence the behavior and attitudes of men, particularly
the young, in the general population." On one hand, this influence could be
expected given the enormous efforts devoted to packaging, exposing, and
promoting athletes for commercial purposes.7 Mass media produce images
that heighten the visibility of athletes and increase the likelihood that their
conduct will have a disproportionate impact on shaping cultural values.
On the other hand, undue emphasis on athletes as a primary source of
demeaning sexual attitudes toward women can inappropriately shift focus
from institutional and structural contributors to such attitudes. As explained
below, using the label role model may inadequately describe the impact of
athletes in shaping cultural attitudes because to do so may not only be theoret-
ically unsound, but may risk diverting attention from addressing structural
factors that result in athlete violence against women.
The role model concept has been invoked in discourse regarding the
influence of athletes in matters ranging from drugs72 to violence against
Picks Up the Pieces ofHer Life, N.Y. TIMEs, June 1, 1997, § 8, at 1 (quoting author Jeff Bene-
dict).
69. See Donald Sabo & Michael A. Messner, Whose Body Is This? Women's Sports and
Sexual Politics, in WOMEN IN SPORT: IssuEs AND CONTROVERSIES, supra note 53, at 20
(observing that "[i]n a very real sense, young male athletes' attitudes toward and relationships
with girls and women, whether sexual or not, are constructed through (indeed, are often dis-
torted by and subordinated to) their relationships with their male teammates").
70. John C. Pooley, Player Violence inSport: Consequencesfor Youth Cross-Nationally
(Part I1), J. INT'L COUNCIL FOR HEALTH, PHYsICAL EDUC., AND RECREATION, Spring 1989, at
6,6.
71. In asegment on ABC'sNightline, noted sociologistHarry Edwards described Michael
Jordan and other star athletes as commodities that are packaged and promoted to market the
products of companies. Air Jordan - The Selling of an Idol, ABC NIoHTLINE (ABC News
television broadcast Feb. 7, 1997); see also Jerry Roberts & Randall Tierney, NBA Dribbles
to H'Wood, HOLLYWOOD REP., June 9, 1997, at 54 (commenting that marketing of athletes has
become sophisticated endeavor); Erik Spanberg, Sponsors Buzzfor Rice ShootingStarBecom-
ing Hot Commodity, BUSINEss JOURNAL-CHARLOTrE, Apr. 21, 1997, at 1 (discussing efforts
corporations engage in to package and promote athletes who promote their products); Gene
Yasuda, Making Penny a Shoe-Biz Star, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 29, 1995, at Al (same).
72. A notable example of the invocation of the role model concept notwithstanding the
absence of an empirical basis occurred in Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47Jv. Acton. Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661-64 (1995). The Vernonia court relied, in part, on the perceived
influence of athletes as role models in holding that a school district's mandatory random drug
testing program for students who participated in interscholastic athletics did not violate
constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches. Id. at 663-67. Without empirical
basis the court asserted: "It seems to us self-evident that a drug problem largely fueled by the
'role model' effect of athletes' drug use, and of particular danger to athletes, is effectively
addressed by making sure that athletes do not use drugs." Id. at 663.
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women.73 In the latter context, one commentator observed:
[I]t doesn't really matter whether athletes commit violence against women
at a rate greater than the general population .... What I am concerned
about is the enormous effect athletes have as role models on some men.
When we see stories on a consistent basis, as we have, that prominent
athletes have done terrible things and sometimes it gets papered over, that
sends a message to some men that maybe it's really kind of OK - and
really it might be kind ofcool. That's the message we have to turn around.'
Professor Adeno Addis explores the genealogy of the role model concept
and the circumstances giving rise to its emergence as a term increasingly
invoked in social and legal contexts.' According to Addis, the term role
model is invoked with increasing frequency without solid empirical footing.76
Professor Adeno Addis persuasively argues that the Supreme Court's inappropriate
invocation of the role model concept in Vernonia is illustrative of the "inconsistent, even
paradoxical, ways" in which courts have used the concept. Adeno Addis, Role Models and the
Politics of Recognition, 144 PA. L. REV. 1377, 1455 (1996). Professor Addis notes that the
Vernonia Court's invocation of the concept displays the use of the concept as if it carries "an
uncontested and clear meaning, thereby dispensing with the need for an extended explanation."
Id. at 1459. Other commentators have criticized the "athlete as role model" justification relied
on by the Vernonia Court. See Michael Hallam, Note, A Casualty of the "War on Drugs":
Mandatory, Suspicionless Drug Testing ofStudentAthletes in Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
74 N.C. L. REv. 833, 856, 859-60 (1996); Denise E. Joubert, Note, Message in a Bottle: The
United States Supreme Court Decision in Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 56 LA. L. REv. 959,
978-79 (1996).
73. The invocation of the athlete as role model in the context of violence against women
proliferated in the aftermath of the O.J. Simpson case. The concept has been liberally employed
in discussions of the impact of O.J. Simpson's violent conduct as well as that of other athletes.
See, e.g., Addis, supra note 72, at 1396 n.58 (noting how O.J. Simpson matter "resurrected the
issue of athletes as role models in the media"); Lundy Langston, Force African-American
Fathers to Parent Their Delinquent Sons - A Factor to Be Considered at the Dispositional
Stage, 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 173, 183 (1994) (discussing impact of character flaws
displayed by role models, such as O.J. Simpson, for African-American male youth); Thomas
Morawetz, Fantasy, Celebrity, and Homicide, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 209, 211 (1995)
(explaining tendency to presume that sports heroes, such as O.J. Simpson, are heroes in all
domains); C. Keith Wingate, The O.J. Simpson Trial: Seeing the Elephant, 6 HASTINGs
WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 130-31 (1995) (stating that O.J. Simpson cannot realistically be viewed as
role model due to his history as wife batterer).
74. Erik Brady, Study Searches for Tie Between Sport, Violence, USA TODAY, Oct. 4,
1995, at IC (quoting then ABA President Roberta Cooper Ramo).
75. See Addis, supra note 72, at 1388-95. In describing the traditional circumstances
under which it is appropriate to apply the role model concept, Addis borrows significantly from
an earlier examination of role model. See generally ROBERTK. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORYAND
SOCIAL STRUCTURE (enlarged ed. 1968).
76. Addis, supra note 72, at 1380. Addis argues that the role model concept is increas-
ingly invoked to achieve certain objectives:
[T]he term is invoked as a means of making and contesting normative claims about
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He argues the role model concept is inappropriately used - particularly in the
case of athletes and entertainers"7 - to describe individuals who fall outside
of the legitimate conceptualizations of "role model."
Addis identifies two traditional circumstances 8 - the "role imitation"
view and "comprehensive" view - where invocation of the role model con-
cept is "empirically informed, logically sound, or normatively defensible."79
Under the role imitation conceptualization, a role model provides an example
in a specific field, such as a lawyer serving as a role model for law students. °
In contrast, the comprehensive conceptualization refers to "an individual who
the desirability of certain activities and as a rhetorical device to defend desired
objectives and to attack unacceptable commitments. Its attractiveness as a rhetori-
cal device has resulted, to some degree, from its elasticity and indeterminancy,
characteristics that allow people to invoke the term to assert varying normative
positions under various circumstances without actually making an extended argu-
ment to defend those positions.
Id
77. See id. at 1380 n.8 (adding that "[e]ven though 'there's little evidence in social-
science literature that children actually adopt the behavior of athletes they adore,' that has not
stopped people from talking about the importance of professional athletes who act as good or
positive role models").
78. Apart from the specific role imitation and comprehensive role modeling situations,
Addis argues that the role model concept is increasingly used in situations that focus on race
and gender emulations. Id. at 1387, 1395. Although he criticizes this shift in use from the
traditional circumstances for invoking the concept of role model as "sometimes logically
unsound, descriptively incoherent, and normatively suspect," Addis believes the new approach
may be useful in the context of the politics of recognition. Id. at 1387. Addis identifies the
politics of recognition as the dominant political fact of the late twentieth century. Id. at 1420.
It involves the desire and process by which those who are excluded seek, through differing
means, validation. Id. at 1420-22. Addis explains that in the United States, the politics of
recognition is the process by which excluded groups who are formally recognized also seek the
informal validation that allows them to be "equal participants in the public life of the commu-
nity." Id. at 1422. He asserts that "[t]he recent movements for diversity and multiculturalism
in the United Sates are informed by this desire for and necessity of recognition." Id. To be
validated means much more than to be recognized as a formal participant in the political
process. Id. It also means to see the processes, the "horizon[s] of significance," the culture,
tradition, and history that go toward defining one's self. Id. As it relates to the politics of
recognition, Addis proposes that "the presence of supposed role models of the same race or
gender provides a countemarrative to the dominant narrative that has reinforced the exclusion
of these marginalized groups." Id. at 1430.
79. Id. at 1459.
80. Id. at 1391. Thus "role imitation" refers "to a socializing process in a social and
political environment where a clear division of roles exists and where people aspire to those
roles by attempting to imitate those whom they regard as performing admirably in those roles."
Id. at 1393. Addis adds that this view of role model traditionally conveyed only positive
meaning since "a professional role model impliedly possesses a certain positive professional
status. So long as the role aspirant disregards other negative aspects of the role model's life,
imitation will be limited to his or her positive traits." Id. at 1392.
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provides a comprehensive example in relation to 'a wider array of behaviors
and values."' 8 ' Thus, a comprehensive role model includes individuals who
may influence certain people through aspects of their lives that "transcend a
particular (professional) role."8" Addis adds that two limitations set the
boundaries under which it is appropriate to invoke role model in the compre-
hensive context: the role model and follower must be "tied by physical
proximity and by an authority-vulnerability social nexus."83 He adds that "[i]n
the absence of physical presence and the authority-vulnerability nexus, the
role model follower only emulates the role model in relation to the specific
role for which he or she is known."
84
Under Addis's conceptualizations, coaches and athletes' peers could
serve as comprehensive role models. Thus a basketball player is a role model
for what he or she engages in - playing basketball. Addis concludes:
Athletes can only serve as comprehensive role models for their children or
for people to whom they are in some way tied. They can serve as role
models in the role imitation sense for anyone who aspires to be-an athlete,
but, despite the conventional wisdom and current popular usage, the notion
of the athlete as a role model in the comprehensive sense seems logically
unsound and normatively undesirable."5
Having defined the circumstances under which it is proper to invoke the
role model concept, Addis explains the basis for his objection to the too
frequent invocation of the comprehensiveness conceptualization of role model
to describe the perceived influence of groups of persons including athletes.8 6
He observes that
focusing on the behaviors and actions of certain individuals and groups to
explain social decay may allow those in positions ofpowerto avoid dealing
with the institutional and structural conditions that led to social decline....
81. Id. at 1393 (quoting MERTON, supra note 75, at 356-58).
82. Addis, supra note 72, at 1393.
83. Id. at 1411. With respect to the first limitation, Addis explains, comprehensive role
models are likely to spend considerable time with role models followers, allowing the latter the
opportunity "to watch closely and study the actions, habits, and commitments of their role
models and perhaps will imitate them someday." Id. at 1394. The other limiting characteristic
is power by comprehensive role models over the persons for whom they serve in that capacity
and a degree of vulnerability in the role model follower. Id. Addis explains that by vulnerabil-
ity he means that the role model follower is subject to sanction from the role model for acting
in ways inconsistent with the "desires and commitments of the role model." Id. Second, "the
role model follower will probably try to earn 'invulnerability and integrity' by purchasing
recognition and approval through a process of emulation." Id.
84. Id. at 1403 (quoting Axel Honneth, Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Con-
ception of Morality Based on the Theory of Recognition, 20 POL. THEORY 187, 189 (1992)).
85. Id. at 1412.
86. Id. at 1416.
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It is easier for those in power to blame black athletes or a televison pro-
gram than to take responsibility for these structural and institutional prob-
lems which they have helped create or sustainY
The modem world of mass media and mass merchandising causes
one to question Addis's differentiation of role specific and comprehensive
role models. For example, perhaps the images created by mass media expo-
sure allow what would have traditionally been considered a specific role
model to have a comprehensive influence despite the absence of interaction
between the role model and follower."8 In this sense, Addis's conceptualiza-
tions may be too narrowly defined. What is significant for our purposes, how-
ever, is Addis's concern that undue focus on the influence of athletes in
shaping cultural attitudes toward women risks "emphasiz[ing] individuals
and individual acts to the exclusion of institutions and collective acts and
constraints." 9
Assuming that athletes are instrumental in shaping cultural attitudes
that translate into violence against women, steps should be taken to counter-
act such influence. Not to hold athletes accountable - whether they are in
the professional or college ranks - sends an unattended message, particu-
larly to men, of the acceptability of sexual violence against women. Yet,
undue emphasis on the conduct of athletes may unintentionally divert atten-
tion from the institutional and structural conditions that contribute to such
attitudes.90
87. Id. He critically observes that"athletes supposedly define for their potential emulators
not only the particular professional role for which they are primarily known, but they are also
expected to define the good and virtuous life for admirers they do not know personally and with
whom they have no contact." Id. at 1403.
He adds that race and gender-specific use of "role model[s] implicitly puts the blame for
the underrepresentation of excluded groups in particular enterprises either on a lack of natural
endowment among members of those groups or on cultural defects (or perceptual problems) that
impede group members from succeeding." Id. at 1418.
88. See NIXON&FREY, supra note 49, at 79 (defining athletes as examples of role models
"who typically exert their influence from afar, especially in the form of mass media images");
Morawetz, supra note 73, at 211 (observing that sports heroes become role models whom fans
seek to emulate in ways that extend beyond athletes' success on playing field).
Indeed, companies such as Nike seek to produce advertisements that not only humanize
athletes, but create emotional ties with consumers. What Makes Nike Run?, INVESTOR'S BUS.
DAILY, Oct. 3, 1995, at A4. Given such intentional efforts, it is not inconceivable that consum-
ers will idolize athletes and attempt to emulate their behavior in the comprehensive and not
simply role imitation sense. See Stephen Edelson, Steelers' Lloyd Just a Football Player,
ASBURY PARK PRESS, Jan. 24, 1996, at D2 (arguing that athletes are role models due in large
part to influence of media, including newspapers, televised sports events, and commercials that
relentlessly place them and all aspects of their lives before public).
89. Addis, supra note 72, at 1384.
90. See Pooley, supra note 70, at 7.
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3. Summary
The enormous popularity and accessibility of sports in America makes
sport a key component of our current gender order.9' Consequently, events
that transpire in sport, including athlete violence against women, contribute
significantly to shaping our cultural attitudes concerning the degree to which
such conduct is deemed socially reprehensible.92 Despite its significance,
however, sport constitutes merely one of the social institutions that is con-
structed by and subsequently aids in establishing gender order in society.
Similarly, athletes represent mere components of the social institution of
sport. Therefore, while it is important that individual perpetrators be held
accountable for their conduct, accountability should extend to a broader insti-
tutional level.
In short, one should view challenging patterns in sport that contribute to
violence against women as part of an overall effort to transform other social
institutions, including our colleges and universities.93 One commentator
adroitly stated: "As long as ... both sexes are socialized to accept male
aggression and female passivity, abuse will remain pervasive. Changing the
conditions that foster violence requires changing cultural perspectives and
priorities. It demands sustained challenges to media presentations, educa-
tional programs, and social services." 9"
The next Part examines whether Title IX is useful as a transformative
tool in addressing structural and institutional factors that influence athlete
violence against women.
1N. Title IX as a Means of Recourse
A. Limits of Litigation Strategy
Before examining Title IX's role in imposing institutional accounta-
bility for student-athlete sexual violence, it is important to consider the
limitations in employing litigation as a tool to address problems that are
broad in scope and the product of multiple variables. 95 Litigation is emo-
tionally and financially expensive.96 Moreover, the "interstitial nature ofjudi-
91. See NIXON& FREY, supra note 49, at 42 (stating that "[c]riticism of sport is not taken
seriously because cultural beliefs about the virtues of sport are so pervasive, so deeply en-
trenched, and so closely tied to dominant American values").
92. See EiTzEN & SAGE, supra note 48, at 55 (noting that sports affect values); HYLAND,
supra note 48, at 2 (noting sports also teaches values reflected in them).
93. See RHODE, supra note 22, at 244.
94. Id.
95. See Smith, supra note 50, at 366.
96. Id.
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cial decision making""7 means that a litigation strategy effectuates change
slowly.9"
Despite such inherent limitations, litigation is a useful tool in effectuating
social change. The role of Title IX litigation in increasing athletic opportuni-
ties for women students demonstrates the usefulness of litigation. It is un-
likely that the increases99 in intercollegiate participation opportunities for
women athletes over the last ten years would have occurred without the threat
of liability exposure that institutions face for failing to comply with Title IX's
gender equity requirements."° Similarly, in the context of sexual violence, a
litigation strategy provides an incentive for colleges and universities to
develop programs and policies that seriously address the issue of sexual
violence by student-athletes. 10 Professor Rodney Smith, while recognizing
the limitations of litigation as a means of addressing important societal issues,
nevertheless concludes that it may "help to facilitate meaningful reform at the
broader legislative or rulemaking level."0
97. Id.
98. Id.at367.
99. A recent report revealed that since 1992 the number of female athletes participating
in competitive intercollegiate athletics has increased by 22 percent. Erik Brady & Tom
Witosky, Title 1XImproves Women's Participation, USA TODAY, Mar. 3, 1997, at 4C. Even
more impressive have been the gains over the two decades since the passage of Title IX. In
1994, over 2.12 million females participated in high school athletics compared to the 300,000
who participated in 1972. Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, 3 DUKE L GENDER L. & POL'Y
51, 52-53 (1996). At the college level, during 1994 over 105,000 female athletes competed
annually in comparison to only 32,000 during 1972. Id. at 52; see also Greendorfer, supra note
53, at 3 (identifying Title IX as watershed in women's sports that at least on surface "seems to
have ushered in significant social change in regard to women's roles in general and women's
involvement in sport in particular").
These impressive gains have unfortunately been accompanied by sobering reminders that
women still lag behind men. For example, "female athletes get just 38% of the scholarship
money, 27% of recruiting money and 25% of operating budgets." Brady & Witosky, supra.
Moreover, during the 1995-96 academic term, women accounted for only 35% of athletes
participating in Division I-A sports even though they account for half of the students enrolled
at these institutions. Id. See generally NCAA GENDER-EQUITY STUDY SUMMARY OF RESULTS
(1997).
100. See Smith, supra note 50, at 354-55 (noting that success and threat of Title IX
litigation has prompted many administrators to seek gender equity in intercollegiate athletics);
Brady & Witosky, supra note 99, at 4C (noting critically that "[h]istorically, it has taken a
lawsuit by female athletes to achieve corrective action" under Title IX).
101. See Gregory E. Karpenko, Note, Making the Hallways Safe: Using Title IXto Com-
bat Peer Sexual Harassment, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1271, 1273 (1997) (implying that as result of
litigation and development of precedent, students will be better informed of their legal rights
and will seek legal and non-legal recourse).
102. Smith, supra note 50, at 367.
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B. Title IX Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence
Title IX of the Education Act of 1972103 forbids discrimination on the
basis of sex in any educational program or activity receiving federal funds."4
Over the last decade, the statute has gained notoriety due in large measure to
its role in increasing participation opportunities for women athletes. 5
However, attempts to expand the reach of Title IX both within and outside of
the athletic participation context have occurred in the last several years. 6
With respect to the latter, increased recognition of the pervasiveness of sexual
harassment in educational settings has spawned lawsuits based on Title IX.' 7
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
104. Id. § 1681 (a). The statute provides in pertinent part: "No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... "Id.
105. See supra text accompanying note 100.
106. With respect to the former, women coaches have resorted to Title IX in efforts to
achieve equal compensation. See, e.g., Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.
1994); Bartges v. University of N.C. at Charlotte, 908 F. Supp. 1312, 1318-19 (W.D.N.C.
1995), affd, 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1996); Paddio v. Board of Trustees for State Colleges and
Univs., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 86, 87 (E.D. La. 1993).
107. Numerous commentators have acknowledged the pervasiveness of sexual harassment
in the classroom and the emergence of Title IX as a means of addressing the problem. See, e.g.,
Jollee Faber, Expanding Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to Prohibit Student to
Student Sexual Harassment, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 85, 91 (1992) (discussing peer sexual
harassment cases based on Title IX and suggesting that courts employ Title VII's interpretive
framework in future Title IX sexual harassment cases); Elaine D. Ingulli, Sexual Harassment
in Education, 18 RuTGERs L.J. 281, 291-92 (1987) (setting forth Title IX's prohibitions against
discrimination on basis of sex, and concluding that federal courts have interpreted statute as
giving victims of educational sexual harassment right to sue under Title IX); Miller, supra note
22, at 706 (acknowledging Title IX as "primary tool" used to address educational sexual
harassment claims); JoAnn Strauss, Peer Sexual Harassment of High School Students: A
Reasonable Student Standard and an Affirmative Duty Imposed on Educational Institutions,
10 LAW & INEQ. J. 163, 172 (1992) (recognizing that Title IX's prohibitions of sex discrimina-
tion have been applied to remedy sexual harassment in schools); Edward S. Cheng, Note, Boys
Being Boys and Girls Being Girls-Student-to-Student Sexual Harassmentfrom the Courtroom
to the Classroom, 7 UCLA WOMEN'sL.J. 263,294-315 (1997) (identifying and analyzing cases
in which plaintiffs have turned to Title IX to address peer sexual harassment); Elizabeth J. Gant
Comment, Applying Title VII "Hostile WorkEnvironment"Analysis to Title IXofthe Education
Amendments of.1972 -An Avenue ofRelieffor Victims ofStudent-to-Student Harassment in the
Schools, 98 DIcK. L. REv. 489, 490 (1994) (recognizing that Title IX is frequently applied to
peer harassment cases and concluding that Title VII standards should be used to impose liability
on educational institutions); Laurie LeClair, Note, Sexual Harassment Between Peers Under
Title VII and Title IX. Why Girls Just Can't Wait to Be Working Women, 16 VT. L. REV. 303,
317 n.120 (1991) (arguing that while sexual harassment cases have been litigated under Title
IX, current state of law affords litigants little protection); Christopher T. Nixon, Note, Civil
Rights Law - Title IX- School Liability for Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment, 64 TENN.
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The contours of this body of Title IX sexual harassmentjurisprudence are not
yet firmly established. Nevertheless, this developing body of law provides
helpful insights into issues fundamental to the question of institutional liabil-
ity for student-athlete violence against women: (1) the theoretical and practi-
cal propriety of employing Title IX as a basis for holding colleges and univer-
sities legally accountable for student-athlete violence against their female
peers; and assuming Title IX's applicability, (2) the standard by which Title
IX liability should be assessed. As the following overview of Title IX case
law reveals," 8 under certain circumstances, the statute holds considerable
potential for allowing women a private right of action against institutions of
higher education that fail to take affmnative measures to protect them against
violence by student-athletes.
This overview also shows that sexual harassment claims in educational
settings typically involve one of two factual scenarios: teacher-to-student
harassment and student-to-student harassment. In the former group of cases,
most courts recognize students' claims against educational institutions for
teacher sexual harassment as justiciable. In the absence of Supreme Court
guidance, however, these courts have failed to establish a definitive legal
standard for assessing liability."9 In the second group of cases, courts grapple
with whether claims based on hostile environments created by peer harass-
ment are legally cognizable. Although the prevailing trend is to recognize
such claims, confusion exists as to the substantive standard for determining
institutional liability.
10
L. REV. 237, 256 (1996) (concluding that Davis court's use of Title IX to address student-to-
student sexual harassment case was "a welcome extension of Title IX" and that it furthered
Congress's goal of protecting students from sex discrimination in education).
108. This Article only provides a brief overview of the history of Title IX jurisprudence
in the sexual harassment context. See supra note 107 (analyzing historical development of Title
IX sexual harassment case law). See generally Karpenko, supra note 101; Monica L. Sherer,
Comment, No Longer Just Child's Play: School Liability Under Title IX for Peer Sexual
Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 2119 (1993); Neera Rellan Stacy, Note, Seeking A Superior
Institutional Liability Standard Under Title IX for Teacher-Student Sexual Harassment, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1338 (1996).
109. See Stacy, supra note 108, at 1338-39 (explaining no definitive standards of liability
exist and criticizing standards applied by most courts as inadequate for failing to provide
schools with substantive incentives to create effective preventative and monitoring measures
against harassment).
110. See Karpenko, supra note 101, at 1273 (explaining that although most federal courts
recognize peer hostile environment claims as actionable under Title IX, they disagree about
nature and extent of school's liability); see also Vema L. Williams & Deborah L. Brake, When
a Kiss Isn't Just a Kiss: Title IXand Student-to-Student Harassment, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV.
423, 442-55 (1997) (discussing confusion among courts regarding appropriate substantive
standard to apply in Title IX peer harassment claims); Cheng, supra note 107, at306-15 (same).
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1. Teacher-to-Student Sexual Harassment
Two issues predominate in teacher-to-student sexual harassment law-
suits: (1) whether a teacher's conduct toward a student amounts to sexual
harassment and (2) whether educational institutions should be held liable for
the inappropriate conduct of their teachers. Courts have address the first issue
with relative ease since sexual harassment by a teacher involves forms of mis-
conduct that courts have deemed repugnant in Title VII employment discrimi-
nation cases. In the context of employment discrimination, both quid pro quo
harassment and sexual misconduct that creates a hostile work environment
have been defined. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
guidelines define quid pro quo harassment as the conditioning of certain bene-
fits upon the granting of sexual favors."' The EEOC and the Supreme Court
have defined hostile work environment harassment. The EEOC defines
hostile work environment harassment as conduct that has the "purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment.""' 2
On the other hand, the liability issue has defied easy resolution as courts
attempt to provide redress to student victims of sexual harassment in a manner
that is both just to victims and fair to educational institutions. In seeking to
balance the competing interests of students and schools, courts have adopted
one of three principal substantive standards of liability"3 in teacher-to-student
111. See29C.F.R. § 1604.11(c)(1997).
112. Id. § 1604.11 (a)(3). The Supreme Court defined hostile work environment as one that
is objectively and subjectively hostile as well as severe and pervasive. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986).
The above definitions, though set forth in the context of employment discrimination, are
transferable to the education context because of the similarity in manifestations of sexual
harassment. With respect to education, sexual harassment includes the following: directing
sexual comments at a student, staring, or inappropriately touching and fondling a student.
Stacy, supra note 108, at 1338. In addition, a teacher may "make offensive sexual advances
toward a student;" coerce the student into performing sexual acts by promising high grades if
the student complies or by threatening to fail the student if she does not comply; and worst yet-
a teacher may rape a student. Id; see also RHODE, supra note 22, at 231 (offering another
definition of educational sexual harassment).
113. Currently, only the three standards discussed below have emerged in this area of Title
IX jurisprudence. Stacy, supra note 108, at 1339. However, one commentator has expressed
concern that, in the absence of Supreme Court precedent, lower courts may rely on Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), to fashion a fourth standard based on Title VI.
Stacy, supra note 108, at 1364 & n.146. In Cannon, the Supreme Court allowed a petitioner
to file a sex discrimination suit against a university under Title IX. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694.
Although the Court limited its discussion of Title VI to that aspect of the statute that provides
a basis for recognition of a Title IX private right of action, the Court's mere reference to the
Title VI statute has created suspicion that some federal courts will promulgate a Title VI-based
liability standard for Title IX sexual harassment claims. Stacy, supra note 108, 1364-65. One
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sexual harassment cases: (1) a Title VII based "knew or should have known"
standard,' 4 (2) a strict liability standard, or (3) a liability standard based on
common-law agency principles."' 5
A predicate to liability under the Title VII standard is a showing by the
student that a school knew of the harassment or should have known yet did
nothing to curtail a teacher's sexual misconduct."' In a frequently cited
opinion, Patricia H v. Berkeley UnifiedSchoolDistrict,"7 the court acknowl-
edged that Title IX generally is patterned after Title VI, but concluded that the
Title VII standard is appropriate in Title IX sexual harassment cases because
the type of conduct prohibited by each statute is the same."' The holding in
commentator argues that such a broad interpretation of the Cannon decision would require
student plaintiffs to prove that "their institution knew of the teacher's conduct and participated
in the harassment." Id. at 1364. The author's primary concern seems to be that such an onerous
standard would provide little protection to victims of teacher harassment because most sexual
harassment claims do not involve the school district as a direct accomplice. Instead, the role of
educational institutions in Title IX sexual harassment cases has generally centered around their
failure, after being placed on notice, to respond to a student's complaint of teacher harassment.
Recently, one court cited Cannon as providing a basis for imposing a Title VI intentional
discrimination standard. Nelson v. Almont Community Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345, 1353 (E.D.
Mich. 1996). The court held, however, that intentional discrimination requires "a showing of
direct involvement of the school district in the discrimination or actual or... constructive
knowledge on the part of the [school] district of the sexual harassment of a student and that the
school failed to take immediate appropriate action reasonably calculated to prevent or stop the
harassment." Id. at 1355.
114. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1995),
forbids sexual harassment in employment. In interpreting the statute, lower courts have
interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71
(1986) (noting that employer liability should be determined by "agency principles"), as setting
forth a test based on actual or constructive knowledge. See, e.g., EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881
F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding employer liable if "management level employees
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known" of hostile work environment);
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,905 (1 th Cir. 1982) (holding that plaintiffmust show
that "employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take
prompt remedial action").
115. See Stacy, supra note 108, at 1339 (explaining that standard, which does not require
institutional knowledge because it imputes teacher's conduct to educational institution, can be
interpreted either as strict liability standard or as one based on agency principles).
116. Id. at 1348, 1360 (commenting that "caution must be exercised, however, when
embracing... [this standard] because the workplace and school contexts differ so drastically"
and because Title VII standard allows school room to avoid liability by "averting its eyes to the
problem").
117. 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
118. PatriciaH. v. BerkeleyUnified Sch. Dist., 830F. Supp. 1288, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
The conclusions reached by the Patricia H. court were premised, in large part, on the court's
interpretation of theFranklin decision as precedent for the application of Title VII's interpretive
framework to a Title IX sexual harassment case. Id. at 1291-93. In 1992, the Supreme Court
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Patricia H. represents the prevailing trend-applying the Title VII "knew or
should have known" test to adjudicate teacher-to-student sexual harassment
claims brought pursuant to Title IX." 9
A clear minority of jurisdictions have applied a strict liability standard
which does not require the educational institution to have any knowledge of
the teacher's misconduct. Instead, the harassing conduct of the teacher is
blindly imputed to the institution. 2 Courts have offered several justifications
in support of the adoption of a strict liability standard. These include the
belief in the existence of "extreme and inherent inequities in age and
power," ' the belief that teachers who harass female students use "the author-
ity vested in them by the school to further their illegal conduct,"'" and the
addressed a teacher-to-student Title IX sexual harassment case in Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992). The Court determined that monetary damages are available
to Title IX claimants. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76. The Franklin Court reached its conclusion by
analogizing teacher/student harassment claims to Title VII employment discrimination cases.
Id. at 75. The Court's use of Title VII case law, in this regard, suggested to lower federal courts
that it approved of the use of a Title VII-based liability standard for Title IX teacher-to-student
harassmentcases. Consequently, lowercourts have employedtheTitleVII standardto impose lia-
bility on institutions that fail to remedy teacher-to-student sexual harassment. See, e.g., Kinman
v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 469 (8th Cir. 1996); Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New
River Community College, 31 F.3d 203, 207 (4th Cir. 1994); Doe v. Covington County Sch.
Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp. 554, 565-70 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1290.
119. The use of Title VII as an interpretive framework for Title IX first occurred in
Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 1977), af'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980),
which involved an assertion of quid pro quo sexual harassment. See also supra note 118 and
accompanying text (providing detailed discussion of evolution of use of Title VII liability
standard in Title IX teacher-to-student sexual harassment cases).
After Alexander, courts expanded the reach of Title IX by allowing employees of educa-
tional institutions to bring Title IX actions premised on hostile environment sexual harassment.
See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding educational
institution can be liable under Title VII "knew or should have known" standard for failing to
remedy hostile environment created by university employees); Mabry v. State Bd. of Commu-
nity Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 (10th Cir. 1987) (recognizing thatTitle
VII substantive standard applies to Title IX claim); Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Med., 613
F. Supp. 1360, 1366 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (finding school can be liable under Title IX if it condoned
discriminatory conduct).
120. See Stacy, supra note 108, at 1339 (concluding that when courts use strict liability
standard, knowledge is irrelevant because teacher's harassing conduct is imputed to institution);
see also Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Sch., 917 F. Supp. 1423, 1427-29 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (recognizing
strict liability standard as appropriate in cases of teacher-to-student harassment in high school
context); Leija v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947, 953 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd,
101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying strict liability standard to teacher-to-student harassment
at elementary school level). The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary
judgment, stating that, "simply put, strict liability is not part of the Title IX contract." Id.
121. Bolon, 917 F. Supp. at 1429.
122. Id.
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concern that "unless the acts of the employees of the district are fully and
strictly imputed to the district, Title IX becomes potentially inoperative.'23
While the strict liability standard may be beneficial because it creates an
incentive for schools to develop "effective preventative and monitoring
measures" to protect young women from sexual harassment, 24 it can errone-
ously place responsibility on an innocent school district which had no knowl-
edge of the teacher's harassment. The potential for this standard to impose
liability to hold an inculpable educational institution responsible for the
misconduct of a third party has caused some courts to view it as overly broad.
Hence, strict liability is unlikely to be adopted as the substantive standard of
liability in Title IX teacher-to-student sexual harassment cases.'2
Despite judicial reluctance to apply a strict liability standard, at least one
court has adopted agency principles to assess an institution's liability when
a student plaintiff cannot produce evidence that the school knew about or
should have known about the teacher's harassment.1 26 In Kracunas v. Iona
College,27 two students sued their college alleging that a professor sexually
harassed them in violation of Title IX.121 The court held that agency princi-
ples, similar to those applied in Title VII cases, were applicable to cases of
teacher-to-student sexual harassment.'29 The Kracunas court explained that
under Title VII an employer is liable for the hostile workplace environment
created by an employee in two circumstances: (1) if the harasser is the plain-
tiffs supervisor and uses his "actual or apparent authority to harass the
123. Leija, 887 F. Supp. at 953.
124. Stacy, supra note 108, at 1339, 1342 (arguing in favor of standard that does not
condition liability on institution's level of knowledge because requiring institutional knowledge
as predicate to liability may create incentive for educational institutions to close their eyes to
problem of sexual harassment committed by teachers). Butsee Kimberly A. Mango, Comment,
Students Versus Professors: Combating Sexual Harassment Under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 23 CONN. L. REv. 355, 360-90 (1991) (discussing legislative history of
Title IX and its relationship to Title VII).
125. See Stacy, supra note 108, at 1342 (expressing support for use of agency principles
under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958) to address hostile environment
claims in context ofteacher-to-student sexual harassment because it is "more palatable" to apply
than strict liability standard). A standard based on the agency concept would require that a
student prove that a teacher was aided in the accomplishment of the tort by the existence of an
agency relationship. Id at 1372.
126. See Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 1997). But see Doe v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting adoption of agency
principles and holding school district liable if management level official knew of harassment
and failed to end it).
127. 119F.3d80(2dCir. 1997).
128. Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1997).
129. Id. at 86.
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plaintiffs" or is otherwise "aided in the harassment by the existence of the
agency relationship" and (2) if the harasser is a low-level supervisor or co-
worker and the employer "provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or
knew of the harassment and did nothing about it."'3° Relying on this interpre-
tation of Title VII, the Kracunas court concluded that the professor used his
authority as the students' instructor to further his harassment because he
engaged in the complained of sexual harassment during academic meetings in
his office.' This type of conduct, the court posited, reflects the type of
behavior and circumstances for which an employer can be held liable under
the Restatement (Second) of Agency.'32 Pursuant to the Restatement, a court
can hold an employer liable for the conduct of its employee if the latter
"purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance
upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the
existence of the agency relation."'33 Accordingly, the Kracunas court found
the university liable for the professor's conduct because he was aided in the
accomplishment of the harassment by virtue of his position as a university
professor.
34
The Kracunas decision is an aberration in this body of Title IXjurispru-
dence because it is the only court decision to apply the agency test and inquire
into whether a professor was "aided in the harassment by the existence of the
agency relationship."135 While the Kracunas opinion is one of the more recent
cases in this area of the law, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in Doe v. Lago VistaIndependentSchoolDistrict'36 provides
further evidence that Title VII standards continue to dominate this area of
Title IXjurisprudence.' 37 In Lago Vista, the court expressly refused to replace
130. Id. at 85.
131. Id. at 89. The court compared the professor-student relationship to the supervisor-
employee relationship based on thefactthat aprofessorhas the "authority to assign, review, and
grade their work; in addition, he might be called upon to provide... an employment recommen-
dation." Id. at 87.
132. Id. The Kracunas court identified Restatement (Second) of Agency subsections
219(1) and (2)(d) as the applicable provisions. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 219(1), (2)(d)).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958).
134. See Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 87 (2d Cir. 1997).
135. Id. at 85.
136. 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997).
137. See Doe v. Lago Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997). In Lago
Vista, a high school student and her parents brought a Title IX claim, inter alia, against a school
district arising from a teacher's sexual harassment of the student. Id. at 1224. The court in
Lago Vista did not rule on the constructive notice theory of liability because the plaintiff did
not pursue it. Id. at 1225. However, the court did recognize it as a viable theory in proving
liability at school. Id. Under this theory, "Title IX plaintiffs, like Title VII plaintiffs, can
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the Title VII-based standard of liability with a standard based on agency
principles. 3 ' Citing an earlier decision, the court noted that "school districts
are not liable in tort for teacher-student harassment under Title IX unless an
employee who has been invested... with supervisory power over the offend-
ing employee actually knew of the abuse, had the power to end the abuse, and
failed to do so."39 This case provides a strong reminder that while a few court
decisions have applied the strict liability standard or the agency standard, the
trend in teacher-to-student harassment cases is to hold an institution liable
only if it fails to take action after being notified of the teacher's misconduct.
2. Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment
The statutory directives of Title IX are two-fold: to prevent the use of
federal funds for discriminatory practices and to protect individuals against
sex discrimination in education. 40 In the context of teacher-to-student sexual
harassment, these objectives have come closer to realization because of
judicial willingness to impose liability on educational institutions when
teachers engage in sexual misconduct toward students.' In contrast, uncer-
tinty regarding the consequences of imposing liability on educational institu-
tions and competing policy interests undergird greater judicial hesitancy to
hold schools accountable for peer sexual harassment. As the following dis-
cussion reveals, this judicial attitude manifests itself in a split in authority
regarding the propriety of Title IX as a basis for holding educational insti-
tutions legally accountable for peer harassment. This judicial uncertainty,
prevail by showing that management-level authorities should have known of the misconduct and
failed to take steps to end it." Id. (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 1225.
139. Id. (citingRosaH. v. SanElizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106F.3d 648,658 (5th Cir. 1997)).
140. See Cheng, supra note 107, at 293. Like Title VI, Title IX's "primary enforcement
mechanism is the threat of withholding federal funding." Id. This remedy alone, however, does
little to protect the victims of sexual discrimination in education because the Department of
Education rarely uses this "drastic" measure to enforce Title IX. Id.
141. See supra Part III.B.1 (evaluating jurisprudence of teacher-student sexual harass-
ment). Several policy reasons have been identified as supporting greaterjudicia willingness to
impose liability for teacher-to-student sexual harassment as opposedto student-to-student sexual
harassment. See, e.g., Leijav. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947,951-52 (W.D. Tex.
1995) (finding that "[o]ne of the core objectives of Title IX is to provide relief to young girls
sexually abused by their male teachers at schools receiving federal funds"), rev'd, 101 F.3d 393
(5th Cir. 1996); AnitaBernstein, Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1227,1229
n.14 (1994) (observing that sexual harassment exists in almost all settings where people of
unequal power must co-exist); CarrieN. Baker, Comment, ProposedTitle IXGuidelines on Sex-
BasedHarassment ofStudents, 43 EMORYL.J. 271,277 n.36 (1994) (concluding that frequent
incidents ofsexual harassment may "contribute to the tremendous decline in girls' self-esteem");
see also infra text accompanying notes 151-53 (discussing policy reasons that support imposi-
tion of liability on schools for peer-to-peer sexual harassment).
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derived in part from differing views concerning the relationship between Title
IX and Title VII, has produced confusion among courts regarding the applica-
ble substantive standard of liability in cases of student-to-student harassment.
a. Recognition of Hostile Educational Environment Claims
Student-to-student sexual harassment claims revolve around allegations
that such conduct creates a hostile educational environment."' Hostile envir-
onment claims are common in the context of workplace sexual harassment.
When such claims began to arise in the context of education, the judiciary
gradually embraced them as actionable under Title IX. For example, the Pa-
tricia H. court recognized the viability of hostile educational environment
claims when a teacher sexually harasses a student.1 43 The court therein inter-
preted Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools'" as implicitly recogniz-
ing Title IX hostile educational environment claims as cognizable.
45
In Doe v. Petaluma City School District46 (Doe 1), the same federal
district court as in Patricia H. became the first to recognize the viability of a
Title IX hostile environment claim involving peer sexual harassment. Doe I
involved a junior high school student who brought an action against a school
district, a counselor, and a principal, alleging that they failed to put an end to
sexual harassment inflicted by the student's peers. 47 The court relied on
Patricia H. to hold that harassment by a fellow student could amount to a
hostile educational environment, which is a violation of Title IX.4 ' In so
ruling, the court noted that the court in Patricia H. conditioned liability on the
"finding of a hostile environment" and the school district's "knowing failure
to act.'" 49 The Doe I court also stated that failure to recognize a student-to-
142. This differs from teacher-to-student harassment cases where claims may be brought
under either a quid pro quo or hostile environment theory. The former theory is unavailable in
peer harassment cases because a student is powerless to demand or coerce another student to
engage in sexual conduct in exchange for promises of good grades or threats of bad grades.
143. See Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
144. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
145. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 65 (1992).
146. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
147. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1564-66 (N.D. Cal 1993)
[hereinafter Doe 1] (involving junior high school student who sued school district under Title
IX because the school failed to take action to curtail harassment her peers were inflicting upon
her). Ultimately, the court granted a motion for reconsideration on the standard of liability
issue. Id. at 1583. The court reconsidered this issue in Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949
F. Supp. 1415, 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996) [hereinafter Doe I1].
148. See Doe I, 830 F. Supp. at 1572.
149. Id. at 1573.
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student hostile educational environment claim as within the purview of Title
IX "would violate the Supreme Court's command to give Title IX a sweep as
broad as its language.""' °
Despite its reliance in part on Patricia H. in extending the hostile envi-
ronment analysis to peer sexual harassment cases, theDoe Icourtfailed to cite
to the policy justifications articulated in Patricia H. Those policy reasons
appear applicable, however, to cases of peer harassment. In Patricia H., the
court articulatedthe following rationale: "[A] nondiscriminatory environment
is essential to maximum intellectual growth and is therefore an integral part
of the educational benefits that a student receives.""' The court further
posited that a "sexually abusive environment inhibits, if not prevents, the
harassed student from developing her full intellectual potential and receiving
the most from the academic program. " 5 These observations are significant
in cases involving student-to-student harassment - including student athlete
violence against women - if for no other reason than they represent judicial
acknowledgment of the manner in which sexual harassment can affect the
quality of a victim's education.'53
While Doe I and its progeny represent the prevailing trend, 54 a few
courts have declined to recognize such claims as falling within the prohibi-
150. Id. at 1575.
151. See Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D. Cal.
1993) (citing Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEx. L.
REV. 525, 551 (1987)).
152. Id.
153. The discussion in Patricia H. regarding the impact of sexual harassment on education
is relevant to the issue of imposing liability on universities for student-athlete harassment of
female students because it is probative on the issue of whether the harassment denies the victim
the benefits of an educational program receiving federal financial assistance. An affirmative
finding in this regard constitutes a direct violation of Title IX, which states: "No person...
shall be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational
program... receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
154. Doe I is the seminal case involving school liability for peer harassment. Most other
courts addressing the issue have agreed that, under some conditions, student-to-student hostile
environment claims are actionable under Title IX. See Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F.
Supp. 64, 72-73 (D.N.H. 1997) (extending Title IX liability to student-to-student sexual
harassment); see also Cheng, supra note 107, at 308-10 (noting most courts followed lead of
Doe Iin recognizing viability of such claims under Title IX).
The courts have recognized peer-to-peer sexual harassment claims as actionable under
Title IX in a number of cases. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1192
(11 th Cir.) [hereinafter Davis 1], affd en banc, 120 F.3d 1390 (1 lth Cir. 1997); Collier v.
William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209, 1212-13 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Nicole M. v. Martinez
Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1377-78 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Bruneau v. South Kortright
Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 171-72 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City
Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1469 (N.D.Cal. 1995), order affd, 122 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1997);
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tions of Title IX. 5' The reasons articulated in these cases include the follow-
ing: (1) the behavior of a fellow classmate is "neither part of, nor an activity
of a school program," meaning the harm is not proximately caused by the
federally funded program and therefore falls outside the parameters of Title
IX;.56 (2) Title IX is patterned after Title VI, not Title VII, and consequently
Title IX does not expressly include a cause of action for hostile environment
claims; 57 and (3) the extension of liability for student-to-student harassment
does not "clearly-flow" from Title IX, nor can such a responsibility be gleaned
from prior sexual harassment cases involving an institution's "duty-to-pro-
tect.15
8
In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education59 (Davis I1), an en banc
rehearing affirming the trial court's dismissal of a peer-to-peer sexual harass-
ment claim based ostensibly on Title IX, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit cited most of the above factors. 6 ' The Eleventh
Circuit articulated several reasons in support of its finding that Title IX does
not permit an action against a school district for its failure to address a hostile
Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1204-05 (N.D. Iowa 1996);
Linson v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., No. Civ.A. No. 95-3681, 1996 WL 479532, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 21, 1996); Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1419
(N.D. Iowa 1996); Bosley v. Kearney R-l Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1022-23 (W.D. Mo.
1995).
155. See Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53, 58 (D. Conn. 1995) (finding teacher not
liable under Title IX for failure to protect student from peer sexual harassment in classroom
because of qualified immunity); Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363,
367 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (finding school board not liable under Title IX because lack of clear notice
by Congress that such liability exists), affd on reh 'gsub nom. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of
Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (1 th Cir. 1997); Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1118 (D.
Utah 1994) (declining expressly to decide whether such claims are viable under Title IX), affd,
84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996).
156. See Cheng, supra note 107, at 307 (citingAurelia D., 862 F. Supp. at 367). The harm
alleged in student-to-student sexual harassment cases is not merely the occurrence of the sexual
harassment, but also that the school allows or ignores its occurrence.
157. See id. (citing Seamons, 864 F. Supp. at 1118). Despite the absence of explicit
directions in the statute to allow claims for hostile educational environments to be brought
under Title IX, well-settled case law shows that such claims are actionable under the statute.
158. See id. at 308 (citing Mennone, 889 F. Supp. at 58); see also Patricia H. v. Berkeley
Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1292-93 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (setting forth overriding
policy concerns that justify extension of Title IX to include cause of action against school for
teacher-to-student sexual harassment claims); supra Part III.B.1 (evaluating jurisprudence of
teacher-student sexual harassment).
159. 120 F.3d 1390 (Ilth Cir. 1997).
160. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1392 (11th Cir. 1997)
[hereinafter Davis II]. In Davis II, the parent of a fifth grader who had been sexually harassed
by fellow students brought a Title IX action against the school board, the superintendent of the
board, and the principal of the school. Id
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environment emanating from student-to-student sexual harassment effectively.
Based upon its analysis of the legislative history of Title IX, the court con-
cluded that Congress did not intend to authorize student-to-student sexual
harassment claims under Title IX. In this regard, the majority found that
Congress, in enacting Title IX, was concerned with eliminating gender dis-
crimination in school admissions, in the availability of school services or
studies, and in employment opportunities for women.' The court also
emphasized the absence of any reference to student-to-student sexual harass-
ment or school discipline in congressional discussions of Title IX.M
A strongly worded dissent took issue with the majority's use of legisla-
tive history to interpret Title IX so narrowly as not to encompass peer-to-peer
sexual harassment claims." The dissent relied on principles of statutory
construction in concluding that the plain meaning of Title IX rendered it
unnecessary to engage in a process of interpretation.'" Furthermore, the
dissent stated that Title IX's language unambiguously establishes that liability
hinges not upon the identity of the perpetrator of sexual harassment, but "upon
whether the grant recipient maintained an educational environment that
excluded any person from participating, denied them benefits, or subjected
them to discrimination." 6' Emphasizing Supreme Court pronouncements that
Title IX should be given a "sweep as broad as its language"'66 and the Office
of Civil Rights' (OCR) broad interpretation of Title IX, 67 the dissent argued
that peer sexual harassment falls within the scope of Title IX "
The dissent also criticized the majority's conclusion that the lack of any
reference to student-to-student sexual harassment in Title IX's legislative
161. Id. at 1395-97. The court noted that Senator Bayh "proposed a provision he thought
would 'cover such crucial aspects as admission procedures, scholarships, and faculty employ-
ment' with limited exceptions." Id. at 1397 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (statement
of Senator Bayh)).
162. Id at 1396-97.
163. Id at 1411-19 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
164. The dissent articulated the maxim that "[c]ourts must assume that Congress intended
the ordinary meaning of the words it used, and absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to
the contrary, that language is generally dispositive." Id. at 1412 (Barkett, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted) (quoting Gonzalez v. McNary, 980 F.2d 1418, 1420 (1 1th Cir. 1993)).
165. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
166. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting) (quotingNorth HavenBd. ofEduc. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,
521 (1982)).
167. The dissent noted that the OCR's interpretation of Title IX to cover peer sexual
harassment is consistent with OCR's interpretation of Title VI to cover peer racial harassment.
Id. at 1413 n.1 (Barkett, J., dissenting). The dissent characterized this similarity as significant
given both the Supreme Court's statement that Title IX is patterned after Title VI and the Davis
II court's reliance on the similarities between the two statutes. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 1412-13 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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history excluded those claims from the statute's scope.'69 In this regard, the
dissent stated: "The mere fact that student-on-student sexual harassment may
not have been specifically mentioned in the Congressional debates does not
mean that it was not encompassed within Congress's broad intent of prevent-
ing students from being 'subjected to discrimination' in federally funded
educational programs."'70 The dissent further posited that the majority's
narrow interpretation of Title IX to include only matters specifically refer-
enced in the statute's legislative history would also exclude teacher-to-student
sexual harassment claims from the parameters of Title IX' 7' According to the
dissent, to conclude that Congress only intended Title IX to cover admission,
services, and employment "contravenes both common sense and the plain
meaning of the words of the statute."'
172
After considering Title IX legislative history, the majority looked to the
notice of liability requirements of Spending Clause statutes to justify its
rejection of Title IX-based student-to-student sexual harassment claims. The
court noted that Title IX's legislative history and similarities between Title IX
and Title VI.73 clearly establish that the former is a Spending Clause statute. 74
According to the court:
To ensure the voluntariness of participation in federal programs, the
Supreme Courthas required Congress to give potential recipients unambig-
uous notice of the conditions they are assuming when they accept federal
funding. A spending power provision must read like a prospectus and give
funding recipients a clear signal of what they are buying. 75
The Eleventh Circuit summarized its reasoning in finding that the school
district did not have the notice contemplated by Congress with respect to
Spending Clause statutes as follows:
First, as we have noted, nothing in the language or history of Title IX sug-
gests that Title IX imposes liability for student-student sexual harassment.
Second, the imposition of this form of liability would so materially affect
schools' decisions whether to accept Title IX funding thatit would require
an express, unequivocal disclosure by Congress. Adopting appellant's
theory of liability, however, could give rise to a form of"whipsaw" liabil-
169. Id. at 1413 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1414 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
173. The majority found that Title IX and Title VI are virtually identical. The court noted
that "[t]he only differences are the substitution of the words 'on the basis of sex' for the words
'on the ground of race, color, or national origin' and the insertion of the word 'educational' in
front of the words 'program or activity."' Id. at 1398.
174. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress spending power).
175. Id. at 1399 (citation omitted).
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ity, under which public schools would face lawsuits from both the alleged
harasser and the alleged victim of the harassment. Moreover, reasonable
public school officials could perceive the likely number of such suits to be
large. Because our endorsement of appellant's theory of liability would
alter materially the terms of the contract between Congress and recipients
of federal funding, appellant fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
17 6
Once again, the dissenting opinion persuasively addressed the concerns
raised by the majority on the sufficiency of notice of liability issue. The
dissent explained that an educational institution has "sufficient notice of lia-
bility based on the plain meaning of the statute, which unequivocally imposes
liability on grant recipients" for maintaining a discriminatory educational
environment.17 In addition, the dissent cited Franklin for the proposition that
the notice requirement under the Spending Clause, which is a prerequisite to
a Title IX damages action, is satisfied when the alleged violation is inten-
tional. 7 Relying on the reasoning articulated in Franklin, the dissent argued
176. Id. at 1401 (footnotes omitted). "Whipsaw" liability, as described by Judge Tjoflat,
arises from the possibility that a school district, attempting to remedy the hostile environment
resulting from student-to-student harassment, faces liability exposure to both the victim and the
harasser. Id. School officials with knowledge of improper conduct by a harasser over whom
they have control could become subject to personal liability to the victim under Title IX if the
harassment persists. Id. On the other hand, a school official who disciplines the alleged
harasser could face a lawsuit on grounds that he or she "acted out of bias - out of fear of suit"
and, consequently, deprived the student of due process. Id. at 1402. Judge Tjoflat concluded
that because of the official's financial incentive to punish harassers, the decisionmaker could
become impermissibly biased and could thus subject the school district to suit by the harasser.
Id. at 1403-04.
Judge Carnes, writing in concurrence, critically pointed outthatmembers ofthe courtwho
agreed with the majority decision, did notjoin in those aspects of Judge Tjoflat's opinion which
discuss "whipsaw" liability. Id. at 1407 (Cames, J., concurring). Judge Cames further enunci-
ated the belief that sexual harassment is such a pervasive problem in schools that it would
expose school districts to massive liability. Id. at 1408 (Carnes, J., concurring). Judge Cames
argued that such matters were unnecessary for resolution of the issue before the court. Id. at
1411 (Carnes, J., concurring). Moreover, Judge Cames severely criticized Judge Tjoflat's
conclusions as being based on faulty premises. Id. at 1407-09 (Cames, J., concurring).
Judge Tjoflat relied on findings of a 1993 survey ofthe American Association ofUniver-
sity Women Education Foundation to buttress his speculation that "whipsaw" liability might
arise in a substantial number of Title IX based student-to-student claims. Id. at 1405. He first
noted the survey's conclusion that 65 percent of students in grades eight to eleven had experi-
enced peer sexual harassment. Id. Based on this survey, Judge Tjoflat calculated that 7,784,000
public school students in those grades would be considered victims of peer sexual harassment.
Id.
177. Id. at 1414 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
178. See id. (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503
U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992)). The Franklin court held that the Spending Clause does not prohibit a
Title IX cause of action for teacher-on-student sexual harassment. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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that the notice requirement was met in Davis 11 given that "the alleged viola-
tion of Title IX was intentional because the school board knowingly permitted
a student to be subjected to a hostile environment of sexual harassment."'7 9
In addition to addressing the broad liability issue, the Eleventh Circuit
commented on the applicability of Title VII standards to analyze Title IX
claims. The court identified three reasons for refusing to apply Title VII
standards. First, the court concluded that "[i]f Congress wished Title IX to be
interpreted like the earlier enacted Title VII, Congress would have written
Title IX to read like Title VII. Congress did not." 80 Second, the court stated
that Congress enacted Title VII, unlike Title IX, under the "far-reaching
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 8' Conse-
quently, the scope of Title IX is narrower than that of Title VII. Third, the
court noted that agency principles underlie Title VII liability.' Because
student-to-student harassment does not involve employees, agency principles
are irrelevant in addressing Title IX liability, and Title VII standards should
not control the outcome of such cases.'
The dissent severely questioned the majority's conclusions regarding the
inapplicability of Title VII standards. The dissent emphasized the extent to
which other courts, including the Supreme Court,184 look to "Title VII princi-
ples to delineate the scope of[a] school board's duty and identify the elements
of a cause of action under Title IX."'185 The dissent noted that since Franklin
"at least five circuit courts have found that Title VII standards are applicable
to students' Title IX sexual harassment claims.' 8 6 The dissent also noted that
virtually every district court that has addressed the issue has found that "Title
IX, by analogy, to Title VII, imposes liability on schools for failure to remedy
severe and pervasive student-on-student sexual harassment."'8 7
179. Id. at 1414 (Barkett, J., dissenting).




184. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992); supra text
accompanying notes 116-19 (noting other courts employing Title VII standard).
185. Davis 11, 120 F.3d 1390, 1415 (11th Cir. 1997) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
186. See id. (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing Oonav. McCaffrey, 122 F.3d 1207, 1209 (9th
Cir. 1997)); see also Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 514 (6th Cir. 1996); Seamons
v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232-33 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1996); Kinman v. OmahaPub. Sch. Dist., 94
F.3d 463,469(8th Cir. 1996); Murray v. New York College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243,249 (2d
Cir. 1995).
187. Davis 1H, 120 F.3d at 1416 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing Bruneau v. South Kortright
Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 172 (N.D.N.Y.1996)).
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b. Defining the Substantive Standard of Liability
Despite the foregoing justifications, the majority of courts recognize the
viability of student sexual harassment claims brought pursuant to Title IX.
However, the court's recognition of such claims has narrowed, rather than
resolved, the issues associated with Title IX student-to-student sexual harass-
ment claims. Given that most courts have concluded that such claims fall
within the scope of Title IX, the primary focus of judicial and scholarly
inquiry shifts to the appropriate substantive standard of liability for determin-
ing when an educational institution's inaction or insufficient action exposes
it to liability for student harassment
The confusion regarding the substantive standard to apply in peer harass-
ment cases is derived in large part from the Supreme Court's opinion in
Franklin.'88 In Franklin, the Court stated that Title IX imposed a duty on
schools not to discriminate on the basis of sex.8 9 In finding that the Gwinnett
County Public School System discriminated against the student plaintiff by
allowing the student's teacher to sexually harass her, the Court analogized the
teacher-student relationship to the supervisor-employee relationship. 9 ' The
Court stated that "when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because
of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of
sex.' 91 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the same rule should apply
when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student."9 The Court further
supported its ruling by citing a Title VII case and summarily concluding that
a school district may be held liable for sexual harassment - in the teacher-
student relationship -the way that an employer may be held liable when such
harassment occurs in the employment context. 93
As a result of the Franklin Court's reliance on Title VII case law, lower
federal courts disagree as to whether the Title VII "knew or should have
known" standard or some other standard should apply in Title IX peer harass-
ment cases. Four standards have surfaced 94 in the debate over the appropriate
standard of institutional liability: (1) Title VII "knew or should have known,"
(2) actual notice,' 95 (3) intentional discrimination proven by direct and circum-
188. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See id. (citing Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
192. See id. at 75.
193. See id. (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64).
194. See Karpenko, supra note 101, at 1284 (setting forth four standards of school board
liability that have emerged and engaging in detailed discussion of each).
195. Id. at 1284 n.88. In Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162,
173 (N.D.N.Y. 1996), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York became
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stantial evidence, and (4) disparate treatment.1 96 The following discussion
briefly examines these standards and concludes that the Title VII and inten-
tional discrimination standards hold the most promise for redressing the
injuries of student victims of peer harassment.
i. Title VII's "Knew or Should Have Known" Standard
As stated above, courts have adopted Title VII as an interpretive frame-
work for Title IX based in part on their interpretation of Franklin.97 How-
ever, the specific application of the Title VII standard of liability to Title IX
peer harassment claims finds its roots in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education'98 (Davis 1). The opinion in Davis I was issued by a three judge
panel of the Eleventh Circuit.'99 The court ultimately vacated the decision in
Davis I so that the matter could be heard en banc.2°° As discussed above, the
Eleventh Circuit, en banc, affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's
Title IX claim.2"' Nevertheless, an analysis of the reasoning of the three judge
panel is necessary because other courts have employed the panel's reasoning
when presented with the issue of Title IX peer harassment.20 2
In Davis I, the parent of a fifth grader who had been sexually harassed by
fellow students brought a Title IX claim against the school board, the superin-
tendent of the board, and the principal of the school.203 The Eleventh Circuit
relied on the Franklin court's analogy of educational sexual harassment to
employment sexual harassment in concluding that Title IX encompasses a
the only court to adopt the actual notice standard for school board liability. Karpenko, supra
note 101, at 1284 n.88. In approving an actual notice standard, the court acknowledged Title
VII standards in general, but declined to adopt the "knew or should have known" liability
standard because of its view that the agency relationships inherent in the employer-employee
relationship do not exist between students and the school. Id. (citing Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at
170-74).
196. See Karpenko, supra note 101, at 1284.
197. See supra Part III.B.2.b (applying Title VII framework to Title IX claims). But see
Karpenko, supra note 101, at 1292 (criticizing federal courts that have relied on Franklin
decision to develop Title VII standards of liability and stating that Franklin Court's reference
to Meritor did not compel, or even suggest, adoption of Title VII liability standards).
198. 74F.3d 1186(llthCir. 1996).
199. See Davis 1, 74 F.3d 1186 (1 th Cir. 1996), aff'den banc, 120 F.3d 1390 (1 1th Cir.
1997).
200. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1418 (1 th Cir. 1996) (vacating
three judge panel decision and granting rehearing en banc).
201. Davis 11, 120 F.3d 1390, 1392 (Ilth Cir. 1997).
202. See Karpenko, supra note 101, at 1285 n.90 (explaining that although Eleventh
Circuit vacated Davis I decision on rehearing en banc, courts still rely on initial decision).
203. Davis1,74 F.3d at 1188.
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claim for peer harassment in the same manner as does Title VII.2 °' The Davis
I court further found that the school board could be held liable if it "knew or
should have known" of the harassment and failed to take remedial action. °5
In an effort to further justify its adoption of the Title VII substantive
standard, the Davis I court pointed to a Letter of Finding by the Department
of Education's OCR.2" This Letter stated that an educational institution may
also be found in violation of Title IX if it "failed to respond adequately to
actual or constructive notice" ofharassment by anonagent student.20 7 Signifi-
cantly, the Eleventh Circuit also enumerated several policy reasons that sup-
port providing students with the added level of protection suggested in OCR's
Letter of Finding. The primary reasons articulated by the court are the follow-
ing: (1) teachers have a greater ability than employers to model and control
appropriate behavior in the classroom, (2) sexual harassment can cause greater
damage in the classroom than in the workplace because of the youth of the
victim and the tendency for schools to institutionalize certain behaviors if they
are allowed to continue, (3) it is more difficult for students to leave their
schools than it is for employees to find new jobs, and (4) a nondiscriminatory
classroom is essential for proper intellectual and emotional growth. 8
As noted above, the reasoning and the policy considerations in the
Davis I decision have served as the bases for other courts to adopt the Title
VII standard of liability. The court in Doe v. Petaluma City School District 9
(Doe I!) was the first district court to follow Davis I and rule that Title VII
was the most appropriate standard to apply in peer hostile environment sexual
harassment cases." The Doe 11 court analyzed several other Title IX sexual
harassment cases that had been decided since it issued its original order.2
204. Id. at 1190-92.
205. Id. at 1193-95.
206. The Office of Civil Rights is the entity under the Department of Education that is
responsible for enforcing Title IX. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.1-.71 (1997).
207. See Davis 1, 74 F.3d 1186, 1192 (1996), aff'den banc, 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir.
1997) (citing Letters of Finding by John E. Palomino, Regional Civil Rights Director, Region
IV, 2 (July 24, 1992)).
208. See Karpenko, supra note 101, at 1286 (citing Davis 1, 74 F.3d at 1193); see also
Miller, supra note 22, at 708 (quoting experts as saying that "sexual harassment could poten-
tially cause both psychological harm, such as depression and anxiety, and physical harm, such
as headaches and eating disorders"); Nixon, supra note 107, at 256 (concluding that harassment
can affect "victim's self esteem and self respect").
209. 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
210. See Doe I1, 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1420-21 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
211. Id. at 1417-20. The court evaluated other recent Title IX decisions. See Bosley v.
Keamey R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1023 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (stating that Title VII
provides most appropriate standard for enforcing anti-discrimination provisions of Title IX and
holding that proof of intentional discrimination could be demonstrated by showing that school
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Nevertheless, it concluded that the standard of liability in student-to-student
hostile environment cases was whether the educational institution failed to
take action to end the hostile environment after it had actual or constructive
notice of such. 2
Recently, in Doe v. Londonderry SchoolDistrict,z1 3 another federal court
adopted a Title VII-based standard for a peer harassment case.214 London-
derry involved an adolescent girl who alleged that the school district took
insufficient action to remedy a hostile educational environment caused by
three male classmates who called her sexually explicit names and frequently
spit on her.2"5 In addressing these allegations, the court ruled that a test of
whether the school district "knew of the harassment and intentionally failed
to take proper remedial action ... best resolves the competing concerns
relevant to school district liability under Title IX in the peer sexual harass-
ment context." '2 16 This language suggests that the court has adopted an inten-
tional discrimination standard. However, close examination of the opinion
reveals that the court may have actually promulgated a Title VII liability
standard.
The court cited to the Doe II decision as persuasive authority for the
definition of "intentional."2 7 In addition, the Londonderry court's reliance
district knew of harassment and intentionally failed to take proper remedial action).
The Doe Ilcourt noted the decision in Rowinskyv. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006
(5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996), but rejected the intentional standard
adopted therein. Id. at 1420. The Doe II court found that the Rowinsky standard requires a
plaintiff to show discriminatory intent on the part of the educational institution by establishing
that the school district treats claims from females differently than claims from males. Doe I,
949 F. Supp. at 1420-21. These developments also served as the basis for the court's granting
of the plaintiffs motion for rehearing regarding the issue of educational institutional liability
for student-to-student harassment. Id. at 1417.
212. The court had previously held in Doe Ithat a plaintiff seeking damages under Title
IX for peer sexual harassment must prove intentional discrimination. Doe I, 830 F. Supp. 1560,
1571 (N.D. Cal. 1993). The court stated, "[I]t is not enough that the institution knew or should
have known of the hostile environment and failed ... to end it." Id.
213. 970 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.H. 1997).
214. See Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 72-77 (D.N.H. 1997) (stating
that "the court looks to Title VII principles for guidance, but adopts a flexible approach
sensitive to the differences between the peer sexual harassment and employment contexts.").
215. Id. at 67-70.
216. Id. at 74.
217. See id. (stating "[tihis court is persuaded by the reasoning of those courts that have
interpreted this requirement to mean that, to be held liable, a school district must have intended
to create a hostile educational environment for the plaintf"'). The Londonderry court cites a
number of cases in support of this statement. See Doe 11, 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1426 (adopting
Title VII test for assessing school district liability); Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist.,
929 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (allowing Title IX action against school district for
STUDENT-ATHLETE SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 93
on the OCR's interpretation of Title IX further supports the proposition that
the court has fashioned a Title VI1-based standard that will allow a plaintiff
to create an inference of intentional discrimination by demonstrating that the
school had knowledge or should have had knowledge of the harassment yet
failed to take remedial action. The Londonderry court specifically stated that
according to the OCR, "a school will be liable under Title IX if its students
sexually harass other students if (i) a hostile environment exists in the
school's programs or activities, (ii) the school knows or should have known
of the harassment, and (iii) the school fails to take immediate and appropriate
corrective action."21 The court's use of the OCR guidelines, in conjunction
with the Doe II decision, which expressly adopts the Title VII standard,
suggests that it interprets the "intentional" standard as merely requiring a
plaintiff to create an inference of intent to discriminate. A plaintiff can create
this inference by complying with the Title VII standard.
ii. Intentional Discrimination Standard
Although Davis land Doe 11 established the foundation for other courts
to adopt the Title VII standard in peer harassment cases,219 not all courts have
elected to follow these decisions. Other courts have applied an intentional
discrimination standard of liability to determine the liability of educational
institutions for peer harassment."0 Under an intentional liability standard, a
its "knowing failure to take appropriate remedial action in response to the hostile sexual
environment created by fellow students").
218. Londonderry, 970 F. Supp. at 72 (citing Office of Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment
Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62
Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,039 (1997) (final policy guidelines)).
219. Several other courts consideringTitle IX peer harassment cases have adopted the Title
VII standard or some limited variation of it. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State
Univ., Nos. 96-1815, 96-2316, 1997 WL 785529, at *7 (4th Cir., Dec. 23, 1997) (using Title
VII test for hostile environment); Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209, 1213
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (recognizing Title VII as "most appropriate analogue" for defining Title IX's
substantive standards); see also Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648,652-53
(5th Cir. 1997) (imposing liability if school has actual notice); Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified
Sch. Dist., 964 F.-Supp. 1369, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (stating school could be held liable if it
knew of harassment and "failed to take steps reasonably calculated to end the harassment");
Franks v. Kentucky Sch. for the Deaf, 956 F. Supp. 741, 746 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (applying Title
VII standard); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1023 (W.D. Mo. 1995)
(applying slightly modified version ofTitleVII standard, which requireg proofthat school "knew
or should have known of the hostile environment and took no or insufficient remedial action").
220. See Karpenko, supra note 101, at 1288. The intentional discrimination standard or
some variation thereof has been adopted in several cases. See Wright v. Mason City Commu-
nity Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1419-20 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City
Sch. Dist., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1463-65 (N.D. Cal. 1995), aff'd, 122 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1997);
Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (applying hybrid
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plaintiff is entitled to recover monetary damages pursuant to Title IX if she
can prove her school intentionally discriminated against her.22'
Once again Franklin has been instrumental in the adoption of the inten-
tional discrimination standard. 2 Franklin's influence was evident in Wright
v. Mason City Community School District,2"2 in which the court stated that
"[t]he Supreme Court's opinion inFranklin explicitly requires morethan mere
negligence to create liability for monetary damages for aviolation of Title IX-
it requires plaintiffs to show an intent to discriminate."' 4 The Wright court
reasoned that
inFranklin, the Supreme Court indicatedthattherespondeat superiortheory
of supervisor liability applies in the Title IX context. Thus, where the
harasser is an agent of the school, a plaintiff must prove that the school
district, or someone for whose actions the school district is responsible,
intended to sexually harass the plaintiff.225
The application of the intentional discrimination standard has resulted in
confusion regarding the precise manner in which intentional discrimination
can be established. Some courts infer discriminatory intent from direct or
standard that mixes elements of Title VII standard with intentional discrimination standard).
Like courts, commentators are split on whether it is more appropriate to apply the Title
VII standard or the intentional discrimination standard. Those who favor the Title VII standard
emphasize that Title VII and Title IX prohibit the same forms of conduct. Faber, supra note
107, at 86-90 (explaining that conduct prohibited by Title VII as creating hostile work environ-
ment also occurs in education and arguing for extension of "Title VII jurisprudence to Title IX
actions"). They also argue that Title IX was promulgated in large part because of the inapplica-
bility of Title VII to sexual discrimination in education. See Miller, supra note 22, at 706
(discussing fact that Title IX emerged as "gap-filler" to Title VII); Williams & Brake, supra note
110, at 442-56 (arguing that Eleventh Circuit's adoption in Davis of Title VII standard is
"legally and ethically.., the way to go").
One proponent of the intentional discriminatidn standard argues that it is most consistent
with legal precedent. Karpenko, supra note 101, at 1298. Specifically, Karpenko states that
courts should incorporate Title VI standards into Title IX since both are Spending Clause
statutes. Id. at 1298-1300. Their status as Spending Clause statutes compels the adoption of
an intentional discrimination standard in both. Id. at 1298-99.
221. Id. at 1298-99.
222. See id. at 1288 (stating that courts which have concluded that Title IX requires
showing of intentional discrimination have typically relied on Franklin decision); see also
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
223. 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
224. Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1419 (N.D. Iowa
1996); accordBurrowv. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa
1996) (acknowledging that plaintiff conceded that she must meet intentional discrimination
standard). The Burrow court applied the intent standard; however, the court did not expressly
rule on the issue. Id.
225. Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1418.
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circumstantial evidence of the totality of the circumstances. Factors that a
court may consider under the totality of the circumstances test include "evi-
dence of the school's failure to prevent or stop the harassment despite actual
knowledge, the school's toleration of the harassing behavior and the per-
vasiveness or severity of the harassment.'2 6 The intentional discrimination
standard was applied in Burrow v. Postville Community School District,
227
wherein the court held that the "plaintiff must prove 'intent to discriminate'
on the part of the school district in a Title IX claim against the school district
for a hostile environment created by known of- yet unchecked - peer-to-peer
sexual harassment.'2S
In Bosley v. Kearney R-1 School District,'29 the court, while professing
to have adopted the intentional discrimination standard, held that the appropri-
ate standard of liability in peer harassment cases is whether the school "knew
of the harassment and intentionally failed to take proper remedial action."' °
The court explained that discriminatory intent does not "require proof that
unlawful discrimination is the sole purpose behind each act of the defen-
dant.... It is, rather, the cumulative evidence of action and inaction which
objectively manifests discriminatory intent."'" The standard articulated in
Bosley seems to combine the Title VII standard and the intentional discrimina-
tion standard. Although the Bosley standard requires proof that a school had
actual or constructive notice of the harassment (in accord with the Title VII
test), it also requires the plaintiff to show that a school "intentionally" failed
to take proper remedial action. 2 At least one commentator believes that this
standard was purposely developed, by the Bosley court, to reflect its interpre-
tation of Franklin as requiring proof that the educational institution intention-
ally discriminated against the student and to acknowledge the trend in other
courts to adopt the Title VII standard. 3 In addition, the practice of creating
226. Karpenko, supra note 101, at 1288.
227. 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
228. Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa
1996); see also OonaR.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1469 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(holding "discrimination may manifest itself in the active encouragement of peer harassment,
the toleration of the harassing behavior of male students, or the failure to take adequate steps
to deter or punish peer harassment").
229. 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
230. Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F.Supp. 1006, 1023 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
231. Id. at 1020.
232. Id. at 1023.
233. Karpenko, supra note 101, at 1289 n.112. In Burrow, the court stated that the
plaintiff"may bring aTitle IX cause of action for damages against PCSD for its knowing failure
to take appropriate remedial action in response to the hostile sexual environment created.by
students atPostville Community High School." Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929
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hybrid standards is a common method that federal courts use to grapple with
this area of Title IX jurisprudence. 4 In this regard, "courts accordingly
adjust the elements for hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII
to reflect [their] determination that Franklin requires a showing of intentional
discrimination. 035
In general, federal court decisions that have adopted the intentional
discrimination standard narrowly interpret Title IX to apply only to conduct
of educational institutions.36 These courts also take the stance that educa-
tional institutions must have notice of their potential liability under Title IX
for the statute to effectively deter discrimination. 7 In this respect, courts that
support the application of the intentional standard reason that an institution
will only have notice of its transgressions and subsequent liability if it actually
intends to discriminate.238
iii The Rowinsky Disparate Treatment Approach
The Fifth Circuit, in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District,"
enunciated the third standard of liability, a disparate treatment approach. 240
In Rowinsky, two sisters were repeatedly harassed at school and on the school
bus by their classmates.24' After filing numerous complaints with the school,
the mother of the two girls brought an action against the school district on
behalf of herself and her daughters.242 Plaintiffs alleged that the school
district and its officials condoned and caused a hostile educational environ-
ment because they failed to respond sufficiently to the girls' complaints.243
The Fifth Circuit held that in a Title IX peer harassment case, "a plaintiffimust
demonstrate that the school district responded to sexual harassment claims
differently based on sex."2"
F. Supp. 1195, 1205 (N.D. Iowa 1996). While the court purports to use the intentional discrimi-
nation standard, the above language from the opinion is reflective of the Title VII standard.
234. Karpenko, supra note 101, at 1289 n.1 12.
235. Id. at 1289.
236. See id. (citing Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1015 (5th Cir.
1996).
237. See Karpenko, supra note 101, at 1289.
238. Id.
239. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996).
240. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 165 (1996).
241. Id. at 1008-09.
242. Id. at 1009-10.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1016.
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In reaching its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit cited three principal factors:
the "scope and structure" of Title IX, its legislative history, and the OCR's
interpretations of the statute.245 Regarding Title IX's "scope and structure,"
the Rowinsky court concluded that, since Congress enacted Title IX pursuant
to its spending power, it can only prohibit discriminatory acts of grant recipi-
ents. 46 The court stated that "[a]s an exercise of Congress's spending power,
Title IX makes funds available to a recipient in return for the recipient's
adherence to the conditions of the grant."247 The court further noted that
"[w]hile it is plausible that the condition imposed could encompass ending
discriminatory behavior by third parties, the more probable inference is that
the condition prohibits certain behavior by the grant recipients themselves."
248
The Rowinsky court's latter concession undermines the Fifth Circuit's conten-
tion that its holding is consistent with the "scope and structure" of the Title IX
statute. The Supreme Court issued a mandate in North Haven Board of
Education v. Bell49 that the scope of Title IX should be given a "sweep as
broad as it's language.""5 The Rowinsky court's failure to interpret the statute
as including peer harassment is contrary to the Supreme Court's mandate that
the statute be broadly interpreted.
The court then turned to the legislative history and concluded that Title
IX's purpose was to prevent sex discrimination in education by grant recipi-
ents only."' It stated:
[T]itle IX, like its model Title VI, sought to accomplish two related, but
nevertheless somewhat different, objectives. First Congress wanted to
avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices;
second, it wanted to provide individual citizens effective protection against
those practices.... [Bloth of these purposes were repeatedly identified in
the debates on the two statutes. Both supporters and opponents of the
amendment focused exclusively on acts by the grant recipients.
2 2
Finally, the court construed the OCR's interpretation of Title IX as "con-
sistent with refusing to impose liability for the acts of third parties.""u3 In this
regard, the court stated:
245. See Cheng, supra note 107, at 311.
246. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1012.
247. Id. at 1012-13.
248. Id. at 1013.
249. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
250. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 789, 801 (1966)).
251. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1014 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972)).
252. Id. at 1013-14.
253. Id. at 1014.
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The only OCR documents to apply Title IX to peer sexual harassment, i.e.,
recent Letters of Finding, should be accorded little weight. Any weight
the letters do have are [sic] outweighed by both the implementing regula-
tions and the Policy Memorandum promulgated by the OCR. As a legisla-
tive regulation, the implementing regulations found at 59 C.F.R. § 106 are
accorded far greater deference than are interpretive regulations such as
Letters of Finding."4
Relying on the foregoing rationale, the court held that the standard in
Title IX peer harassment cases should require a student plaintiff to show that
the school engaged in unequal treatment of the females, as compared with the
males. 5 The court stated that "a school district might violate Title IX if it
treated sexual harassment of boys more seriously than sexual harassment of
girls, or even if it turned a blind eye toward sexual harassment of girls while
addressing assaults that harmed boys.
''2 6
The Fifth Circuit rationale in support of its holding suggests that the
Rowinsky court disregarded the overriding public policy issue implicit in Title
IX student-to-student sexual harassment cases -the institution's responsibility
to prevent hostile educational environments. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit
appears to disregard the consequences of allowing educational institutions to
turn a deaf ear to complaints of peer harassment. Accordingly, the other
federal courts have flatly rejected the Rowinsky approach, finding its reason-
ing faulty.7
In Doe 11, a California district court harshly criticized an underlying
rationale of the Rowinsky opinion. The Doe Hlcourt explained that the thrust
of hostile educational environment claims is to impose liability on educa-
tional institutions based on their own conduct of "knowingly permitting the
discriminatory hostile and abusive environment to continue and to inflict an
254. Id. at 1015.
255. Id. at 1016.
256. Id.
257. See Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209, 1212 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
("We disagree with Rowinsky. The Fifth Circuit failed to consider the role the omissions of the
school district may have played [in harassment]"); Doe 11, 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1421 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (rejecting Rowinsky and stating that it does not recognize that inaction may actually
constitute actionable discrimination); Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist, 929 F. Supp.
1193, 1204 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (rejecting approach taken by Rowinsky court).
Like courts, commentators have criticized the disparate impact standard adopted by the
Rowinsky court for Title IX peer harassment claims. These criticisms focus on the Rowinsky
court's fundamental misunderstanding of the essence and factual basis of peer harassment
claims and the purpose and objectives of Title IX. See Anouchka Oppinger, Note, Educational
Law - Title 1K- Peer Sexual Harassment - Still A live and Well In Our School Hallways After
Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165
(1996), 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 307, 322 (1997).
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ongoing injury on its female students. " "u The insight appropriately shifts
focus in peer harassment cases to institutions' reprehensible conduct in failing
to remedy hostile environments, rather than student-offenders' conduct in
creating it.
The Doe H court's criticism of Rowinsky also provides insight as to why
the latter is the only court to adopt the disparate treatment standard. The
Rowinsky standard effectively requires a plaintiff to meet a doubly unrealistic
burden. First, the standard is unrealistic because schools are unlikely to have
as many claims of sexual harassment from males as they will from females;
therefore, such a standard will not be an accurate gauge of the school's
treatment of peer sexual harassment complaints. Second, the Rowinsky
standard requires a plaintiff to produce evidence of the school's motivation for
its treatment of her claims. Students are unlikely to have first hand knowledge
of such information.
Various federal courts continue to criticize the Fifth Circuit's disparate
treatment standard. A recent decision that has rejected the applicability of the
disparate treatment analysis, in student-to-student sexual harassment claims,
is Collier v. William Penn School District 5 9 In Collier the court held un-
equivocally that Title IX should impose liability on a school district when it
fails to prevent or eradicate a sexually hostile environment created by students
since such an environment discriminates and limits educational opportunities
based on sex. 260 The court, interpreting Title IX broadly, 26' found that if a
plaintiff established facts to support her allegations that the school district was
aware that she was being harassed by a fellow student, yet tolerated such
conduct, the district would have denied the plaintiff the benefits of its educa-
tional program and/or subjected her to discrimination in violation of Title
IX.
262
The court also noted its disagreement with Rowinsky:
We disagree with Rowinsky. The Fifth Circuit failed to consider the role
the omissions of the school district may have played. In our view, the
inquiry should focus on whether the school district, as a recipient of federal
funds, failed, after notice, to prevent or curtail the sexual harassment of
students within its charge.263
258. Doe II, 949 F. Supp. at 1421.
259. 956 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
260. See Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209, 1213 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
261. The court cited to Supreme Court precedent in finding that Title IX should be given
"a sweep as broad as its language." Id. at 1212.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1212.
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In addition, the Collier court identified several factors that supported using
Title VII as the analogue when defining Title IX's substantive standard.
These include the Collier court's interpretation of Franklin v. Gwinnett as
authorizing the use of Title VII standards in Title IX cases involving peer
harassment, Title IX's role in filling gaps left by Title VII, and the OCR's
interpretation of Title IX as permitting the application of the Title VII substan-
tive standard.2 4
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Oona v. McCaffrey 2 65 found that school districts have a duty to take reason-
able steps to prevent harassment by fellow students.266 In so ruling, the court
criticized Rowinsky's interpretation of Title IX, which severely restricts the
actionablity of student-to-student sexual harassment claims under Title IX.
The Oona court stated that it would "not consider what steps school officials
may reasonably be required to take to prevent harassment."267 The court
tempered its explicit refusal to endorse or create a standard of liability with
its reliance on other appellate court decisions that have adopted the Title VII
standard of liability to resolve Title IX sexual harassment claims.268
C. Institutional Liability for Peer Harassment: The Collegiate Level
Issues regarding the availability of Title IX and the appropriate substan-
tive standards to employ in peer harassment cases in educational settings have
arisen primarily in the primary and secondary school context. Nevertheless,
the few cases to address peer harassment claims brought pursuant to Title IX
at the collegiate level have specifically addressed these issues. An overriding
policy reason for allowing such claims in the context of post-secondary educa-
tion is derived from one of the fundamental missions of institutions of higher
education -the promotion of academic freedom.269 Included within this rather
264. Id. at 1212-13.
265. 122 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1997).
266. See Oona v. McCaffrey, 122 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 1997).
267. Id. at 1211.
268. The court relied on Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996).
In Kinman, the Eighth Circuit considered a school district's duty to prevent sexual harassment
under Title IX as synonymous with an employer's duty to prevent such harassment under Title
VII. Kinman, 94 F.3d at 469. The court stated that "[w]e see no reason to apply a different
standard under Title IX." Id. at 468. The Oona court also relied on the ruling in Doe v.
Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir.1996), which noted the use by circuits of Title VII
standards to resolve sexual harassment claims under Title IX. Doe, 103 F.3d at 514. The Oona
court's reference to these cases suggests an implicit recognition of the applicability of Title VII
standards to Title IX student-to-student sexual harassment claims, even though Kinman and
Claiborne involve teacher-to-student sexual harassment.
269. See EveLyn Oldenkamp, Pornography, The Internet, and Student-to-Student Sexual
STUDENT-ATHLETE SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 101
expansive goal is the notion that universities should undertake policies and
procedures that safeguard a student's freedom to learn." This goal has
played a central role in the two reported decisions that adjudicated Title IX
student-to-student sexual harassment claims at the collegiate level.271 The
following discussion briefly examines these cases as a prelude to an examina-
tion of the propriety of employing Title IX to provide redress for co-ed
victims of student-athlete violence. This discussion reveals that peer harass-
ment at collegiate levels manifests in misconduct similar to that which occurs
at the primary and secondary school levels. Such conduct includes sexually
explicit verbal remarks and occasional offensive touching.272 In addition,
however, the more liberal nature of the college campus lends itself to more
egregious forms of sexual misconduct such as rape, sexual assault, and stalk-
ing.273 To the extent that student-athletes engage in these forms of miscon-
duct, this Article proposes that Title IX is an effective means of redress for
women students.
1. Linson v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania
Linson v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania,274 involved peer
sexual harassment at the collegiate level.275 In Linson, the plaintiff, a male
graduate student, sought damages based upon the university's failure to eradi-
cate an alleged hostile educational environment created by a fellow graduate
Harassment: A Dilemma Resolved with Title VII and Title IX, 4 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
159, 172 (1997).
270. Id.
271. See Linson v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., No. Civ.A. No. 95-3681, 1996 WL
479532, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1996); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ.,
935 F. Supp. 779,782 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd, Nos. 96-1814,96-2316, 1997 WL 785529 (4th
Cir., Dec. 23, 1997).
272. See, e.g., Davis I, 74 F.3d 1186, 1188 (1lth Cir. 1996) (summarizing plaintiff's
factual allegations as follows: fellow fifth grader attempted to fondle her and directed offensive
language toward her); Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1414
(N.D. Iowa 1996) (stating that student harassed and humiliated plaintiff by calling her names
like "whore," "bitch," and "slut" and by scrawling graffiti about her); Doe I, 830 F. Supp. 1560,
1564 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that "most of the harassment was verbal, in the form of state-
ments about Jane having a hot dog in her pants or that she had sex with hot dogs").
273. See Terry Nicole Steinberg, Rape on College Campuses: Reform Through Title IX,
18 J.C. & U.L. 39,41 (1991) (stating that"American colleges and universities may discriminate
against female students because of their sex by failing to address the problem of campus rape"
and explaining that "[r]ape on college campuses ... is a systemic problem requiring far-
reaching solutions").
274. No. Civ.A. No. 95-3681, 1996 WL 479532 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1996).
275. Linson v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., No. Civ.A. No. 95-3681, 1996 WL 479532,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1996).
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student. The plaintiff alleged that another student engaged in unwanted
conduct toward him that included "verbal solicitations for sexual contact,
unwanted touching of the private areas of the plaintiff s body, strangling, and
other nonconsensual touching." '276 Mr. Linson further alleged that as a result
of his reporting of the sexual harassment, the university engaged in retaliatory
conduct against him.277 With respect to the allegations of a hostile environ-
ment, the plaintiff alleged that he reported the harassment to a university
official, but the university failed to take sufficient remedial action.278 In
addressing the fundamental issue of whether the plaintiffpresented a cogniza-
ble Title IX hostile environment claim, the court noted that the majority of
courts recognize such claims.279 Based on the overwhelming body of prece-
dent, the court found that "a school's failure to eradicate a hostile environment
caused by [sexual harassment from another student] may also result in the
school's liability for monetary damages under Title IX where intentional
discrimination is shown."280 Thus, the court expressly recognized as cogniza-
ble a Title IX peer harassment claim at the collegiate level.28" '
2. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Universit/ 82 (Brzonkala 1) is
the other case in which a court has examined the applicability of Title IX in
276. Id.
277. Id. Plaintiff alleged that the university's retaliation consisted of refusing to reinstate
plaintiff into school, threats to expose his police record, refusing to provide him with letters of
recommendation, causing plaintiff to be terminated from his nonstudentjob, blocking plaintiff's
access to university resources, and questioning him regarding the sexual harassment allegations.
Id. at *5.
278. Id.
279. Id. at *2.
280. Id. at *3. In reaching this result the court followed precedent established by courts
that have examined sexual harassment in the primary and secondary school context. The Linson
court rejected the approach taken in Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139
(W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989), in which the court refused
to recognize a Title IX hostile environment claim involving allegations by female students that
the university's teachers sexually harassed them. Bougher, 713 F. Supp at 145-46. The court's
holding in Bougher was based upon its refusal to incorporate the Title VII hostile environment
analysis into Title IX. Id.
281. The court ultimately concluded however that the plaintiff failed to establish the
elements of a Title IX hostile environment claim. According to the court, the plaintiff did not
"point to anything in the record indicating that the University's alleged discriminatory actions
were gender-motivated." Linson, 1996 WL 479532, at *4. The court further noted that
"Franklin requires a determination that 'at least one defendant official has affirmatively
discriminated against the student on the basis of gender."' Id. at *3.
282. 935 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. Va. 1996).
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a case of peer harassment in the collegiate context.283 In addition, it is the
283. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772, 779 (W.D. Va.
1996) [hereinafterBrzonkalal ], rev 'd, Nos. 96-1814,96-2316, 1997 WL 785529 (4th Cir. Dec.
23, 1997). The Brzonkala district court issued two opinions. In the first opinion, the court
dismissed plaintiff's Title IX claim on the ground that she failed to demonstrate-that the
University's conduct was based on illegal discriminatory intent. Il However, the court
allowed Brzonkala to proceed with her claim under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 773. In its second opinion, the court
addressed Brzonkala's VAWA claim against the university. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic
& State Univ. 935 F. Supp. 779, 781 (W.D. Va. 1996) [hereinafter Brzonkala 11], rev'd, Nos.
96-1814, 96-2316, 1997 WL 785529 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997). With respect to her VAWA
claim, Brzonkaa alleged that her assailants sexually assaulted her with discriminatory animus
toward her gender and that such conduct violated her right to be free from gender-motivated
violence under the VAWA. Id. at 784. The district court recognized that Ms. Brzonkala
successfully stated a claim under the VAWA. Id. at 784-85. It nevertheless dismissed her
VAWA claim when it ruled the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 801. The court premised its
ruling on its position that Congress lacked the authority to enact the statute "either under the
commerce clause or under the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
Congress created VAWA to address the problem of gender-based crime. See Chris A.
Rauschl, Comment Brzonkalav. Virginia Polytechnic and State University: Violence Against
Women, Commerce, andtheFourteenthAmendment-Defining ConstitutionalLimits, 81 MIN.
L. REV. 1601, 1603 (1997) (stating that Congress enacted VAWA to combat "the escalating
problem of violent crime against women" (quoting S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993))).
Accordingly, the VAWA creates a private right of action for victims of gender-motivated violent
crimes. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994). This rather expansive scope ofVAWA would potentially
include a claim against a student-athlete for violence directed at the victim because she is a
woman. This fact was recognized by the district court, in that it conceded Ms. Brzonkala had
brought a successful complaint under the statute. Brzonkala HI, 935 F. Supp. at 785. However,
it nullified that ruling by declaring the statute unconstitutional.
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit considered, inter alia, whether the
district court erred in holding that Congress's enactment of the VAWA exceeded its authority
under the Commerce Clause. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., Nos. 96-1814,
96-2316, 1997 WL 785529, at *15-16 (4th Cir., Dec. 23, 1997) [hereinafterBrzonkalal1]. In
reversing the district court's ruling, the Fourth Circuit first noted the strong presumption of
validity and constitutionality where legislative judgments are based in part on empirical data.
Id. at * 15. Adopting a rational basis standard for determining if a "regulated activity substan-
tially affects interstate commerce," the court concluded that under the directive of UnitedStates
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), Congress had arational basis when it found that violence against
women has a major effect on the national economy. Brzonkala 11I, 1997 WL 785529, at * 15.
The court's conclusion was influenced substantially by extensive empirical data gathered by
Congress in support of its "unequivocal and persuasive finding" regarding the impact of
violence against women on interstate commerce. Id. at *19. Given the detailed nature of
Congress's finding, the court stated that "[w]hen a court finds 'that the legislators, in light of
the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory
scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, [its] investigation is at an end."' Id. at *20
(citations omitted).
The Fourth Circuit aligns with other courts that have upheld the constitutionality of the
VAWA. Seaton v. Seaton, No. 3:96-CV-741, 1997 WL 391601, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. July 1,
1997); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608,610 (D. Conn. 1996). The Fourth Circuit's ruling is also
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only case that involves sexual harassment by student-athletes against a woman
student.28 a Ms. Brzonkala alleged that she was brutally raped by two members
of the Virginia Polytechnic and State University (VPI) football team in a room
located on the third floor of her dormitory.285 Subsequent to the incident, Ms.
Brzonkala filed charges against both athletes under the school's sexual assault
policy. VPI conducted a disciplinary hearing, and only one of the athletes,
Antonio Morrison, was found guilty of abusive conduct and suspended for
two semesters.286 Morrison appealed the decision. Without notifying Ms.
Brzonkala, VPI set aside the suspension and allowed Morrison to return to
school the following semester on a full athletic scholarship.287 Upon learning
that VPI permitted Morrison to return, Ms. Brzonkala canceled plans to return
to VPI to complete her education.2 8
Based on these factual assertions, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia interpreted Brzonkala's Title IX complaint as
alleging that VPI participated in creating a hostile educational environment by
allowing the student-athlete to return to campus while the plaintiff was still
a student.289 In response to Brzonkala's complaint, the court ruled that a Title
IX claim based on student-to-student harassment brought against the univer-
consistent with the views of commentators critical of the district court's holding.
At least one commentator has criticized the district court's refusal to recognize the cause
of action for victims of gender-motivated crimes. See Rauschl, supra, at 1604. The commenta-
tor argues that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to enact the
VAWA. Id. Rauschl contends that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress
the power to enforce the Amendment. Id. at 1614. Moreover, when "Congress identifies an
equal protection violation... [i]t is entitled to significant judicial deference." Id. Rauschl
adds, "Congress's choice of aremedy is also entitled to judicial deference and will be sustained
if it is 'plainly adapted' to enforcing the Amendment and does not violate other constitutional
limitations." Id.
284. See Redmond v. University ofNeb., No. 4:CV 95-3223, 1995 WL 928211, at *2 (D.
Neb. Dec. 5, 1995) (refusing to determine applicability of Title IX to cases involving student-
athlete violence against women students).
285. Brzonkala I, 935 F. Supp. at 773.
286. Id. The other athlete, Crawford, was found not guilty of sexual assault due to
insufficient evidence. Id. at 774. Morrison appealed the finding of the first hearing that he was
guilty of sexual assault. Brzonkala 111, 1997 WL 785529, at *2. The outcome of the second
hearing was a finding that he was guilty of abusive conduct. Id. It was this finding that VPI
set aside. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. VPI did not inform Brzonkala that Morrison's suspension had been deferred. Id.
She learned of this through a newspaper article. Id; see Rauschl, supra note 283, at 1602 n.13
(discussing facts of Brzonkala cases).
289. Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 778 (stating that "[a]lthough Brzonkaa does not
specifically argue this point, it is possible to glean from her complaint an allegation that VPI
has a hand in permitting a hostile school environment based on Brzonkala's gender").
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sity is actionable.29 Next, the court articulated a two prong test for determin-
ing what constitutes a hostile environment: (1) conduct that objectively
creates a hostile or abusive environment, and (2) the victim's subjective
perception that an environment is abusive.29" ' Applying this test, the
Brzonkala I court held that the plaintiffs hostile environment claim was
premature because it was based on her fear of future reprisal that had not
actually materialized.2'
On appeal in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Uni-
versity293 (Brzonkala II1), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit considered whether Ms. Brzonkala stated a Title IX claim against VPI
pursuant to hostile environment and disparate treatment theories. 94 Relying
on Title VII jurisprudence and cases which have adopted Title VII analysis in
Title IX litigation, the court concluded that an "educational institution's
handling of a known sexually hostile environment is actionable" under Title
IX.295 In so holding, the Fourth Circuit severely criticized the Fifth Circuit's
"deeply flawed analysis" '296 in Rowinsky. Arguing that Rowinsky incorrectly
framed the issue in terms of liability for acts of third parties, the court stated:
[I]n a Title IX hostile environment action a plaintiff is not seeking to hold
the school responsible for the acts of third parties (in this case fellow
students). Rather, the plaintiff is seeking to hold the school responsible for
its own actions, i.e. that the school "knew or should have known of the
illegal conduct and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action." ...
Therefore, the entire focus of Rowinsky's analysis as to whether a school
may be held responsible for the acts of third parties under Title IX misses
the point. Brzonkala does not seek to make [VPI] liable for the acts of
third parties. She seeks only to hold the school liable for its own discrimi-
natory actions in failing to remedy a known hostile environment.297
Having found that peer hostile environment claims are actionable under
Title IX, the court turned to whether Ms. Brzonkala alleged facts were suffi-
cient to establish VPI's liability for a hostile environment claim. The court
adopted a Title VII standard of liability and articulated the test as "whether
Brzonkala has alleged facts sufficientto support an inferencethat [VPI] 'knew
290. Id.
291. Id. (citing Harris v. ForldiftSys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), for two-prong test and use
of Title VII standards in Title IX case).
292. See Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 778.
293. Nos. 96-1814, 96-2316, 1997 WL 785529 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997).
294. Brzonkala III, Nos. 96-1814, 96-2316, 1997 WL 785529, at *5 (4th Cir. Dec. 23,
1997).
295. Id. at *5.
296. Id. at *6.
297. Id. at *7 (citations omitted).
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or should have known of the illegal conduct and failed to take prompt and
adequate remedial action." 29' Applying this test, the appellate court rejected
the district court's finding that, because Ms. Brzonkala failed to return to
campus, a hostile environment never occurred. The court reasoned that the
district court failed to recognize that the rape of Ms. Brzonkala created a
hostile environment and that VPI was aware of this environment and failed to
properly remedy it.299 According to the court, "[g]iven the seriousness of the
harassment acts, the total inadequacy of [VPI's] redress, and Brzonkala's
reasonable fear of unchecked retaliation including possible violence, Brzon-
kala did not have to return to the campus the next year and personally experi-
ence a continued hostile environment."3"
Linson and Brzonkala I are significant because they recognize that peer
sexual harassment claims are actionable against colleges and universities.
These cases are also instructive on the issue of what standards courts will
apply in determining an institution's liability. In Linson, the court adopted an
intentional discrimination standard. In Brzonkala III, the Fourth Circuit
adopted the Title VII test for what constitutes a hostile educational environ-
ment. Next, the Article discusses the applicable standard of liability in
student-athlete peer harassment claims.
D. Institutional Liability for Student-Athlete Sexual Harassment
1. The Title VII Standard
a. Brzonkala and the Title VII Standard
Given the overwhelmingjudicial precedent, courts are likely to find little
difficulty in recognizing as actionable Title IX sexual harassment claims
against institutions stemming from the conduct of their student-athletes. The
Linson and Brzonkala decisions, as well as cases involving peer sexual harass-
ment at the primary and secondary school levels, support bringing this form
298. Id. at *9.
299. Id. at*6.
300. Id. at *9. The Fourth Circuit placed particular emphasis on the egregious nature of
the circumstances that underlie Ms. Brzonkala's hostile environment. These included facts
revealing that Ms. Brzonkaa was brutally raped three times, ceased attending classes, attempted
suicide, sought the aid of the university's psychiatrist, and that university officials, including
the psychiatrist, made only a cursory inquiry into the cause of plaintiff's distress. Id. at *9-10.
The court also found it material that VPI officials provided neither a fair hearing nor exacted
appropriate punishment given the seriousness of Ms. Brzonkala's allegations. Id. at *9-10.
With respectto plaintiff s disparate treatment claim, the court applied aTitle VII standard
that requires proof of discriminatory intent. Id. at * 11. Agreeing with the district court, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to establish the requisite
discriminatory intent. Id. at * 11-12.
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of misconduct within the parameters of Title IX. As alluded to above, the
Brzonkala decisions will play a central role in setting the legal backdrop for
courts addressing this issue in the future. The lack of Supreme Court prece-
dent means courts, as in cases of peer harassment generally, will struggle to
define the appropriate substantive standard of care to apply. In this regard,
two issues are likely to emerge as critical in defining the limits of institu-
tional liability: (1) the propriety of applying the Title VII standard to cases
involving student athlete violence; and (2) assuming judicial adoption of an
intentional discrimination standard, the factual showing a plaintiffimust make
in order to sustain a Title IX claim based upon a student-athlete's misconduct.
With respect to the adoption of the Title VII standard, two narrower
issues come into focus: (1) whether the Brzonkala decisions provide a basis
for employing the Title VII standard in this context, and (2) whether the
unique relationship of the student-athlete to his university supports adopting
a Title VII standard.
With respect to the first of these issues, the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
BrzonkalaIII is likely to be particularly persuasive. The court borrowed from
Title VII case law in articulating the five elements of a Title IX hostile envi-
ronment claim. A plaintiff asserting a hostile environment claim must estab-
lish: (1) that plaintiff is a member of a protected group, (2) that plaintiff was
the subject of unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) that the harassment was
gender-based, (4) that the severity or pervasiveness of the harassment altered
the conditions of plaintiff's education and created an abusive educational
environment, and (5) that some basis for institutional liability exists.
30 '
Courts that emphasize the judicial trend to apply a Title VII standard
because the educational opportunity that Title IX mandates can only be
effectuated if the educational environment is free ofthe hostility and intimida-
tion that results from sexual harassment will no doubt rely on the Brzonkala
Ill court's adoption of a Title IX standard that is similar to standards em-
ployed in Title VII cases.2 Other courts, however, will point to the policies
that underlie Title IX, its status as a Spending Clause statute, and its relation-
ship to Title VI to support their rejection of such an interpretation. 3
b. Employee Status and the Title VII Standard
Apart from the Brzonkala decisions, an independent basis may exist for
adopting a Title VII standard of care -the uniqueness of the student-athlete's
301. Brzonkalall, Nos. 96-1814,96-2316,1997WL785529, at*7(4thCir. Dec.23,1997).
302. See supra Part III.B.2.b (discussing reasons cited in support of application of Title
VII substantive standard in Title IX peer harassment claims).
303. See supra Part III.B.2.b (discussing reasons courts identify in opposing application
of Title VII substantive standards in Title IX peer harassment claims).
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relationship with his college or university. More specifically, plaintiffs may
argue that student-athletes are employees of the colleges and universities for
which they play sports. Under Title VII, an employer can be held liable for
the sexual misconduct of an employee if the employer had actual or construc-
tive knowledge of the employee's harassing conduct."' Therefore, designat-
ing student-athletes as employees could support application of a Title VII
standard.
The issue of whether student-athletes constitute employees, which typi-
cally arises in the context of workers' compensation benefits, 5 has generated
considerable scholarly debate." 6 Legal scholars largely support affording
student-athletes employee status. They argue that student-athletes comply
with the primary standards0 7 used to determine employee status under exist-
ing workers' compensation legislation.0 In addition to doctrinal consider-
304. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII standard).
305. See generally Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: CompetingModels and Con-
flicting Realities, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 269 (1994) (comparing amateur-education and commercial-
education models of intercollegiate athletics); David W. Woodbum, Comment, CollegeAthletes
ShouldBeEntitledto Workers'CompensationforSports-Relatedlnjuries: A RequesttoBroaden
the Definition ofEmployee Under Ohio Revised Code Section 4123.01, 28 AKRONL. REV. 611
(1995) (examining applicability of workers' compensation laws to scholarship-athletes).
306. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 305, at 282-98; Ray Yasser, Are Scholarship Athletes at
Big-Time Programs Really University Employees? - You Bet They Are!, 9 BLACK L.J. 65, 65
(1984); Mark Alan Atkinson, Comment, Workers' Compensation and College Athletics:
Should Universities Be Responsible for Athletes Who Incur Serious Injuries?, 10 J.C. & U.L.
197, 197 (1984); Robert C. Rafferty, Note, Rensing v. Indiana State University Bd. of Trustees:
The Status of the College Scholarship Athlete-Employee or Student?, 13 CAP.U. L. REV. 87,
87-88 (1983); Sean Alan Roberts, Comment, College Athletes, Universities, and Workers'
Compensation: Placing the Relationship in the Proper Context by Recognizing Scholarship
Athletes as Employees, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1315, 1315-19 (1996); Mark R. Whitmore, Note,
Denying Scholarship Athletes Worker's Compensation: Do Courts Punt Away a Statutory
Right?, 76 IOwA L. REV. 763, 763-67 (1991);Woodbum, supra note 305, at 611-14.
307. The principal standards are the relative nature of the work test and the right to control
the details ofthe work test. Davis, supra note305, at284; Roberts, supra note 306, at 1322-24.
The control test focuses on whether the employer has a right to control, as opposed to
actually controlling, the employee. As one commentator noted:
It is constantly said that the right to control the details of work is the primary test
[of employment]. Courts generally include other factors in their control test
analysis, such as the method of payment, the right to fire, and the fumishment of
equipment. Under the relative nature of work test, courts ask whether the em-
ployee's duties are a substantial and recurring part of the employer's business.
Davis, supra note 305, at 288 (quoting Whitmore, supra note 306, at 775); see also Roberts,
supra note 306, at 1317 (stating that "litmus test of whether scholarship athletes should be
considered as employees.., is whether an implied or express contract for hire exists coupled
with a quid pro quo arrangement with the university").
308. See Roberts, supra 306, at 1347 (stating that "[a]ny test that a court utilizes in order
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ations, legal scholars argue that the nature of the student-athlete/university
relationship, particularly the control that institutions exercise over their
student-athletes, supports employee status.3°9 These variables combine with
the commercial nature of intercollegiate athletics to underscore the true nature
of the relationship as employer/employee.
Despite the urging of scholars, courts have split sharply on the issue
of whether student-athletes are employees.31° In University of Denver v.
Nemeth,3" the court allowed Nemeth to recover for injuries he incurred during
football practice." 2 The court premised its recognition of Nemeth as an
employee of the university on the fact that he cared for campus tennis
courts and cleaned sidewalks, in exchange for fifty dollars per month and
free housing.313 The court reasoned that because Nemeth worked for the
school, his participation on the football team was an "incident of his employ-
ment.
3 14
In contrast, the court in Rensing v. Indiana State University Board of
Trustees31 recognized the contractual nature of the student-athlete/university
to ascertain the relationship between universities and scholarship athletes should result in a
finding that an employer-employee relationship exists"); Woodburn, supra note 305, at 626
(concluding that cases in which courts have deemed student-athletes to be employees correctly
interpret workers' compensation principles).
309. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 305, at 293-98; Roberts, supra note 306, at 1344-47;
Whitmore, supra note 306, at 789-97.
310. See Roberts, supra note 306, at 1327-28 (noting that whether scholarship athletes are
employees remains unsettled issue).
There are several cases in which courts granted student-athletes employee status. See Van
Horn v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (ruling
that scholarship athlete may be considered employee for purposes of workers' compensation
benefits); University of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 430 (Colo. 1953) (en banc) (noting
employee status based on wages earned fromjob specially arranged because of student's athletic
abilities). Other cases have denied student-athletes employee status. See Graczyk v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Bd., 229 Cal. Rptr. 494,499-502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (using statutory
provision enacted after Van Horn that excludes student-athletes from definition of employee as
basis for denial of benefits); State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm'n, 314 P.2d 288,
290 (Colo. 1957) (denying recognition of employee status because "the college was not in the
football business and receives no benefit from this field of recreation"); Rensing v. Indiana State
Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 (Ind. 1983) (holding student-athlete is not
employee due to absence of intent to enter into employment agreement); Coleman v. Western
Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224, 227-28 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (finding university's lack of
control over student-athlete negates employment relationship).
311. 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953).
312. University of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 430 (Colo. 1953) (en banc).
313. Id at 424-25.
314. Id at430.
315. 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983).
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 55 (1998)
relationship. 16 Nevertheless, the court found that the absence of an express
or implied intent to enter into an employment agreement negated the existence
of an employment relationship.317 In Coleman v. Western Michigan Univer-
sity,318 the court, noting the lack of control by the school over the athlete319
and the peripheral nature of college sports in relation to the business of
colleges, concluded that a student-athlete is not an employee.320
The conclusions reached in these cases appear to turn as much on a
court's perception of the inherent nature of college athletics as on whether the
elements of the standards for determining employee status have been satisfied.
These conflicting judicial views can be summarized as follows:
[L]egal doctrine and philosophical visions of college athletics combine to
shape the judicial response to a student-athlete's status as an employee for
worker's compensation purposes. Courts declining to define student-ath-
letes as employees... perceive[ ] college sports as serving an academic
function where intercollegiate athletics are simply an avocation of the
student.
Juxtaposed with these decisions are cases in which the judiciary recog-
nizes the impact of commercialism on college sports and on the student-
athlete's relationship with his university. Here, the duality of the student-
athlete's role, as a student on the one hand and an employee on the other,
provides the framework from which the relevant issues are analyzed. Em-
ployment status stems from the quid pro quo which earmarks the contrac-
tual obligations between a student-athlete and his institution.32'
This split in authority and the increased call to recognize the commercial
realities of college athletics creates the possibility that courts might character-
ize student-athletes as employees of their colleges and universities. Such a
characterization could influence courts to apply a Title VII substantive stan-
dard in determining the Title IX liability of colleges for student-athlete sexual
misconduct.3"
316. Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. 1983).
317. Id. In addition, the court noted that Rensing failed to establish the performance of
services for pay. Id. at 1173-74.
318. 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
319. Coleman v. Western Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224, 226 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
320. Id. at 226-27.
321. Davis, supra note 305, at 298.
322. It is important to note, however, that employee status will not be dispositive on a
court's determination of whether to adopt the Title VII standard. While a court may recognize
a student-athlete as an employee, a court will not recognize the victimized student as an em-
ployee. Since a predicate to liability under Title VII, in the employment context, has typically
been that the harassment is of an employee and by an employee, the fact that the victim is not
an employee may impact a court's analysis. On the other hand, the employee status of the
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2. The Intentional Discrimination Standard
As an alternative to the Title VII standard, a court may adopt an inten-
tional discrimination standard to assess hostile environment claims involving
student-athletes. Assuming that some courts will find it more appropriate to
apply the intentional discrimination standard than the Title VII standard,3" the
nature of the showing a victim of student-athlete violence must make to prove
intentional discrimination on the part of a university emerges as an issue.
Several factual scenarios may provide the basis of a plaintiff's Title IX hostile
environment claim stemming from student-athlete sexual harassment. These
scenarios include facts demonstrating that: (1) an institution recruited a
student-athlete with knowledge that the athlete had ahistory of sexual miscon-
duct toward women, and the student-athlete subsequently sexually assaults a
female student; (2) an institution failed to take action in response to a female
student's complaints in the aftermath of a sexual assault by a student-athlete;
and (3) an institution imposed lenient sentences for a student-athlete's sexual
assault of a female student.
In assessing the ability of a plaintiff to traverse the evidentiary obstacles
erected by an intentional discrimination standard with respect to these scenar-
ios, an analysis of the factual allegations in Redmond v. University of Ne-
brask&24 is instructive.3" A member of the University of Nebraska football
team allegedly sexually assaulted and raped Redmond.326 Redmond alleged
in her complaint that the "Defendant Christian Peter was intentionally re-
cruited to attend the University of Nebraska-Lincoln even though the Defen-
dants by and through their agents knew or should have known that the Defen-
dant Christian Peter had a propensity toward violence, assault, and sexually
aggressive behavior." '327 Moreover, Redmond asserted that the university's
nonresponsiveness to her complaints of sexual harassment by Peter amounted
to a "tacit endorsement of such sexual harassment[ ] and the creation of a
hostile educational environment for [Redmond] by the Defendants.""32
victim appears to be the principal focus of courts which have adopted the Title VII standard in
cases involving teacher-to-student-harassment. The increased responsibility that a university
has regarding the conduct of its agents appears pivotal in persuading courts to adopt the Title
VII standard. See supra Part III.B.1.
323. See supra Part III.B.2.b.ii.
324. No. 4:CV95-3223, 1995 WL 928211 (D. Neb. Dec. 5, 1996).
325. Redmond v. University ofNeb., No. 4:CV95-3223, 1995 WL 928211, at* 1 (D. Neb.
Dec. 5, 1995).
326. See ComplaintofKatherineRedmond 21, Redmondv. University ofNeb., 1995 WL
928211 (D.Neb.Dec. 5, 1995) (No. 4:95CV-3223).
327. Id. 61.
328. Id. 64.
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Redmond's allegations are relevant to the first scenario, which focuses
on an institution's knowing recruitment of a student-athlete with a propensity
for sexual misconduct. More specifically, the allegations suggest that because
the university recruited him in spite of his violent history, the university had
a lack of regard for female students who could potentially be placed injeop-
ardy by the student-athlete's presence on campus. Taken alone, an athlete's
prior history of sexual assault is unlikely to meet the intentional discrimina-
tion standard. However, an institution's knowledge of an athlete's history of
sexual abuse, when combined with facts indicating knowledge by the institu-
tion that such conduct persisted after the athlete became a member of the
campus community, increases the likelihood of a finding of intentional dis-
crimination.
In addition, Redmond alleged that the university engaged in a pattern of
conduct that created a hostile educational environment in violation of Title
IX.329 This conduct included the University's refusal to investigate her allega-
tions of sexual harassment, failure to alleviate the sexual harassment,33 and
failure to investigate, counsel, or discipline Peter.33" ' These factual allegations
are relevant to the second scenario - failure by an educational institution to
take action after it has knowledge of facts that indicate the existence of a
hostile environment. Indeed, this scenario and Redmond's allegations possess
the attributes of the quintessential peer hostile environment claim.
Accordingly, allegations such as those alleged by Redmond appear to
comport with the test for intentional discrimination articulated in adolescent
peer harassment cases. First, the allegations would likely satisfy the standard
set forth in Burrow v. Postville Community SchoolDistrict, in which the court
required the plaintiff to prove "intent to discriminate on the part of the
school." '332 In Burrow, the court stated that the plaintiff could prove intent by
"direct or indirect evidence" and that in the absence of direct evidence, one
could infer intent by looking at the "totality of relevant evidence." '333 The
court ruled that the school's failure to stop the harassing behavior of the
students, over whom it exercised some degree of "physical control," was a




332. Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa
1996).
333. Id.
334. Id; see also supra note 225 and accompanying text (identifying other factors that
create inference of intentional discrimination on part of educational institutions).
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This factor may be particularly relevant to cases, such as Redmond, that
involve sexual harassment by student-athletes because of the degree of control
that colleges and universities exercise over their student-athletes. In Univer-
sity of Colorado v. Derdeyn,335 the Colorado Supreme Court emphasized that
colleges exercise considerable control over the lives of their student-
athletes.3 6 According to the court, colleges regulate academic performance,
course selection, training, practice sessions, diet, attendance at study halls,
curfews, and substance abuse. Moreover, the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) regulations grant colleges the right to cancel a student-
athlete's scholarship if he or she "engages in serious misconduct warranting
substantial disciplinary penalty."38 In short, "the student-athlete's relation-
ship with his or her institution is marked by dominance by institutions over
most aspects of his or her college life."339 Consequently, colleges and univer-
sities are in a unique position to influence student-athletes' behavior in the
campus community. The existence of this type of relationship may prompt
courts to emphasize the control factor when assessing a college's liability
arising out of student-athlete violence toward women.
In addition, the facts alleged in Redmond appear to satisfy the test
adopted in Wright v. Mason City Community School District.30 There the
court held that a plaintiff could demonstrate intentional discrimination by
proof that the educational institution, or someone for whose actions the insti-
335. 863 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993).
336. See University of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 932-36 (Colo. 1993) (en banc).
337. Id. at 940. The athletic director at the University of Colorado described the nature
of the relationship between schools and their athletes as follows:
[T]hat the NCAA sets limits on financial aid awards, playing seasons, squad
size, and years of eligibility; that the NCAA requires that CU maintain records
of each athlete's academic performance; that the "athletes that eat at training
tables are football and men's basketball and the other athletes eat in the dorms or
at their off-campus residences;" that some coaches within their discretion impose
curfews; that athletes are required to show up for practice; that athletes are
"advised ... on what they should take for classes" that "we have a required study
hall in the morning and in the evening;" and that it is "fair to say that the athletes
are fairly well regulated."
Id. at 940-41 (citations omitted).
338. NATIONAL COLLEGIATEATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 1997-98NCAADIvIsIONIMANuAL
art. 15.3.4.1(c), at 184. Article 15.3.4.1.(c) elaborates that "lain institution may cancel or
reduce the financial aid of a student-athlete who is found to have engaged in misconduct by the
university's regular student disciplinary authority, even if the loss-of-aid requirement does not
apply to the student body in general." Id.
339. Timothy Davis, Student-Athlete Prospective EconomicInterests: ContractualDimen-
sions, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 585, 622 (1994).
340. Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
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tution was responsible, intended to sexually harass the plaintiff.34 As previ-
ously discussed, the control that a university exercises over its student-athletes
is substantial and varied.342 This ability to exercise influence over its student-
athletes places a heightened burden on institutions to respond to allegations
that a student-athlete has engaged in abusive behavior toward other members
of the university community. Allegations, such as those in Redmond, that a
student-athlete raped and sexually assaulted a female student, illustrate the
student-athlete's intent to sexually abuse and harass her. Consequently, the
Wright test exposes colleges to a greater risk of liability for the type of con-
duct in which Peter allegedly engaged because a student-athlete could argu-
ably be characterized as someone over whom the university is responsible.343
Although the control factor may be pivotal, it will not be determinative
inasmuch as courts consider a range of factors in assessing the presence of an
intent to discriminate.
Linson may also provide support for women who claim that a college's
inaction contributed to a hostile educational environment.3" The court in
Linson explained that a plaintiff must point to something in the record that
indicates the "University's alleged discriminatory actions were gender moti-
vated."345 For a plaintiff to prevail in a Title IX claim against a university for
student-athlete violence, she could proffer evidence that the institution repeat-
edly failed to discipline or otherwise take actions to address reports that
particular athletes committed acts of sexual misconduct against women.
Finally, the third scenario involves claims of sexual discrimination
emanating from the lenient sanctions an institution imposes on student-ath-
letes for the latter's sexual misconduct. The distinction between this and the
second scenario is somewhat blurred. Like the second scenario, allegations
that focus on the punishment that a college imposes on a student-athlete found
guilty of sexual misconduct relate to actions an institution takes to prevent or
end a hostile environment following acts of peer sexual harassment. Yet by
focusing specifically on the failure of an institution to impose sanctions that
seem to match the severity of the sexual misconduct, plaintiffs allege more
than inaction.
341. See id. at 1419-20.
342. See supra notes 333-37 and accompanying text (explaining colleges exert consider-
able influence over most aspects of student-athletes' lives).
343. See Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1418 (discussing application of respondeat superior
theory of supervisor liability in Franklin decision).
344. See supra Part III.C.1 for a detailed discussion of Linson.
345. Linson v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., No. Civ.A. No. 95-3681, 1996 WL 479532, at*4
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1996).
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Whether such action by a college constitutes a violation of Title IX is
unclear. Brzonkala !provides limited guidance in this regard. The plaintiff
in Brzonkala Ialleged that VPI inadequately disciplined Morrison in order to
permit him to play football.346 More generally she alleged that "VPI authori-
ties treat the violent felony of sexual assault by male students against female
students differently from all other violent felonies. 347
With respect to Brzonkala's contentions relating to the conduct of pro-
ceedings, the court first noted that reasons, devoid of discriminatory animus,
may exist for institutions to treat rape cases differently. 48 With respect to
allegations that VPI afforded male athletes preferential treatment over the
plaintiff as evidenced by VPI's decision to allow Morrison to continue to play
football, the court found that Brzonkala relied on a false comparison. 49
Nevertheless, the court implicitly recognized that it might have reached a
different result if the plaintiff had proffered evidence that VPI gave Morrison
a light sentence not only because he is an athlete, but also because he is a
male. 5 Hence the intentional discrimination standard could potentially be
met by demonstrating the disinterest a university takes in proceedings involv-
ing female athletes who have violated the school conduct code."'
IV. Conclusion
Existing precedent and policy reasons support affording female students
a Title IX cause of action against colleges and universities stemming from the
violent acts of student-athletes. A review of Title IX jurisprudence reveals
that this form of peer sexual harassment falls within the purview of the statute.
Moreover, the idea that "[a] nondiscriminatory environment is essential to
maximum intellectual growth and is therefore an integral part of the educa-
346. Brzonkala I, 935 F. Supp. 772, 777-78 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd., Nos. 96-1814, 96-
2316 1997 WL 785529 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997). More specifically, plaintiff alleged that
"[s]olely because he is a member of [VPI's] all-male football team, Morrison was accorded
affirmative advantages in the second hearing which were not accorded to plaintiff, who is a
female." Id. at 775.
347. Id. at 777.
348. Id. The court stated that rape cases may require different treatment in order to be
sensitive to the interests of the victims. Id.
349. Id at 777-78. The court noted that the relevant comparison would exist if Brzonkala
was facing judicial proceedings in which her status at the college would be at issue. Id. at 777.
According to the court, plaintiffs status was not at issue because she was the victim of a crime.
Id.
350. Id.
351. See Yusufv. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 714-16 (2d Cir. 1994) (suggesting that
Title IX bars imposition of university discipline when gender is motivating factor in discipline).
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tional benefits that a student receives" '352 supports judicial recognition of peer
harassment claims involving student-athletes. When a university is aware or
suspects student-athlete violence yet does nothing to protect the female victim,
it fails in its responsibility to foster an academic environment free of hostility
and fear.353 Such failure on the part of the university is inconsistent with its
duty to provide equal education.
54
In assessing institutional liability, absent Supreme Court guidance, courts
are likely to apply either a Title VII "knew or should have known standard"
or an intentional discrimination standard. These two standards are amenable
to a Title IX claim based on student-athlete violence because they afford the
plaintiff a realistic opportunity to establish the elements of a Title IX cause of
action. In addition, courts are likely to be more willing to apply these stan-
dards because the standards protect educational institutions from frivolous
attempts to hold them responsible for a student's sexual misconduct. Regard-
less of which of these two standards courts apply, student-athlete violence
against women, when combined with institutional indifference, sets the stage
for women victims to meet the requisite evidentiary burdens.
As noted earlier in this Article, sexual harassment is a form of learned
behavior. The effort to change the conditions that foster such behavior must
occur on a broad level. While individuals who sexually harass women must
be held accountable, so too must the institutions and structures that contribute
to sexual harassment by creating environments that perpetuate the sexual
harassment of women. Given the influence of two social institutions - col-
leges and sport -to shape cultural values, holding institutions accountable for
student-athlete violence is a step toward recreating and transmitting societal
norms and values that respect the integrity of women.
352. Patricia H. v. Berkley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(quoting Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEX. L. REV.
525, 551 (1987)). The court recognized that a hostile educational environment can negatively
affect the quality of a student's education. Oldenkamp, supra note 269, at 175-79.
353. Oldenkanip, supra note 269, at 175-79.
354. Id.
